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OPERATIONALIZING DISSUASION

by

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OPERATIONALIZING DISSUASION

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requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Dissuasion is a strategy for persuading adversaries to seek acceptable alternatives to building threatening capabilities or adopting hostile intentions towards the United States. Dissuasion is a framework for organizing strategy directed at dealing with *future* threats. As such, it complements other traditional national strategies (such as deterrence or coercion), and *uses* deterrence, coercion, and even appeasement, to meet overall policy goals.

Dissuasion as a strategy was not formally articulated until it appeared in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Despite dissuasion's comparatively recent recognition, its historical use by states attempting to influence geopolitical rivals has been frequent. Dissuasion is stated as a primary strategy in the capstone national security documents of the United States, but clear guidelines on how dissuasion can be implemented are lacking.

This study expands the understanding of dissuasion as a strategy, examining three historical instances where it was used by states seeking to influence the behavior or military force structure building of other states, bringing dissuasion out of the realm of theory and into the real-world. Tools and procedures are described in order to “operationalize” dissuasion, the role of naval forces in dissuasion is scrutinized, and the vital intersection of strategic culture and dissuasion is examined.

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I. INTRODUCTION TO DISSUASION

A. DISSUASION

In the twenty-first century, the United States will increasingly encounter regional powers that are neither friend nor enemy, while concurrently dealing with outright hostile powers, such as Iran, and potential peer competitors such as China. Dissuasion offers policymakers a strategy for influencing other states before conflict breaks out or tensions rise by steering other nations away from pursuing policies inimical to U.S. interests, such as the development of nuclear weapons.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that “dissuasion” is a stratagem for persuading potential adversaries to seek alternatives to building threatening capabilities and adopting hostile intentions towards the United States.¹ While dissuasion is as a key element of the capstone document of U.S. strategy, it is not clear how to systematically implement dissuasion. The term first appeared in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, but so far, there has been little discussion of how policymakers can craft a dissuasion plan to meet strategic goals. This thesis explores dissuasion as a strategy, and offers suggestions for operational implementation of the concept. At the heart of this thesis are three historical case studies:

- The successful dissuasion of Libya by the United States, resulting in Libya abandoning of its attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities.
- The successful British dissuasion of outside interference in the nascent Baltic States following World War I, which resulted in the formation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
- The unsuccessful attempt in the first decade of the twentieth century by Britain to dissuade Germany from building a fleet that threatened the Royal Navy’s maritime supremacy.

The case studies reveal that dissuasion, despite the fact that few observers recognized it as a distinct concept until 2001, has been habitually used by states seeking to change policies it finds objectionable in other states.

¹ Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (March 2005).

U.S. military strength traditionally lies in the spheres of strategic deterrence and major warfighting. Indeed, American domination of the conventional battlefield is so complete that most adversaries will opt to “push toward the edge” of the warfighting spectrum, by seeking asymmetric alternatives to conventional battle or pursuing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs. Through dissuasion, the United States can influence other nations and international actors to step away from developing policies and capabilities, both conventional and asymmetric, which threaten vital U.S. interests.

Dissuasion is separate from, but complementary to, deterrence. Deterrence threatens violence, usually in retaliation for a hostile act, and is operationalized against current threats. Dissuasion seeks to persuade others to take a different path, or not start down one, and is thus aimed at future threats. Both may occur simultaneously—China, for instance, may be deterred from using nuclear weapons by the threat of strategic nuclear retaliation, while being simultaneously dissuaded from building and deploying a blue-water navy. The essential difference between deterrence and dissuasion is the target: existing capabilities and behaviors are the objective for deterrence; future capabilities and behavior are targeted by dissuasion. Dissuasion need not be passive or non-aggressive: as the case studies demonstrate, coercion and other active strategies are frequently used as part of an overall dissuasion strategy.

Dissuading future behavior and capability building is difficult, at best. States may simply refuse to be dissuaded due to their strategic culture, or may adopt an alternate path equally inimical to American interests. Poorly thought out dissuasion policies may in fact have the reverse effect of that intended by triggering a “security dilemma” response in the target, driving it to building threatening military capabilities as a counter to perceived threats from the United States.²

² John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma,” *World Politics*, Vol. 2 (1950): 157-8. The “security dilemma” is a response to a military buildup or action from a potential rival. A given state may perceive even a defensive buildup as a threat, and accordingly start its own buildup, triggering an arms race.

Potential tools for implementing a dissuasion policy include:

- **Presence and engagement**, both military and diplomatic, which signal U.S. commitment and willingness to defend vital interests, builds state-to-state relationships, secures the “global commons” of the high seas, and provides a ready force to address problems before they harden into major crises.
- **Controlling the spread of technology and arms**, which prevents acquisition of the materials needed to build threatening capabilities, accomplished through arms control regimes, export controls, sanctions, interdiction, and blockade.
- **Conditional support or threatened withdrawal of support**—moral, economic, or military—granted upon condition of desired behavior, or withdrawn to punish undesirable behavior.
- **Economic influence**, such as the direct pressure of sanctions, and promoting ties to prominent segments of the target society that can be leveraged to influence policy.
- **Erecting barriers to competition**, usually through presenting such an overwhelming force or technological lead that an opponent will conclude that effective competition is impossible.

Aside from the broader view, this study also offers insights into the use of naval forces in dissuasion. Naval forces are well suited to dissuasion: they are inherently fungible across the spectrum of warfare, able to go from low-key presence operations to full-scale warfare on short notice. They can quickly move strategic distances to exert pressure, and are less threatening to uninvolved states and allies than forward-based land forces. Presence and engagement are long-standing roles for the U.S. Navy, and the Navy also plays a part in controlling the spread of technology and arms through interdiction and blockade. Maritime forces can be used to provide conditional support without a vast commitment of ground forces, and can be quickly withdrawn from the scene once crisis conditions fade. Navies can exert economic influence through blockade and enforcement of economic sanctions, while warship sales also offer influence by leveraging the support infrastructure that comes with these highly complex systems, and promoting military-to-military ties. Finally, the overwhelming superiority of the U.S. Navy, if maintained, presents an insurmountable barrier to competition, dissuading other states from making the attempt.

Dissuasion complements other national strategies (such as deterrence or coercion) but also uses deterrence, coercion, and even appeasement as part of an overall long-term strategy of dissuasion. The following section describes how dissuasion fits in with other strategies in shaping the security environment:

B. SHAPING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Dissuasion is a tool for policy makers to shape the international security environment into a form favorable to U.S. interests. The National Defense Strategy and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review lay out the security challenges ahead for the United States:

The strategy acknowledges that although the U.S. military maintains considerable advantages in traditional forms of warfare, this realm is not the only, or even the most likely, one in which adversaries will challenge the United States during the period immediately ahead. Enemies are more likely to pose asymmetric threats, including irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges. Some, such as non-state actors, will choose irregular warfare – including terrorism, insurgency or guerrilla warfare – in an attempt to break our will through protracted conflict. Some states, and some non-state actors, will pursue WMD to intimidate others or murder hundreds of thousands of people. Finally, some states may seek capabilities designed to disrupt or negate traditional U.S. military advantages...³

To operationalize the *National Defense Strategy*, four priority areas are identified:

- Defeating terrorist networks.
- Defending the homeland in depth.
- Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.
- Preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.⁴

These four priorities are aimed at four distinct challenges: irregular challenges, such as terrorists or insurgencies; catastrophic challenges such as rogue state or terrorist acquisition of WMD; traditional military challenges from a rising near-peer competitor; and disruptive challenges that leverage unforeseen technologies to defeat U.S.

³ Department of Defense, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review* (2006), 19.

⁴ Ibid.

conventional advantages. The relationship between priorities, challenges, and the forces needed to deal with them are illustrated in Figure 1:




Figure 1. Challenges Facing the United States.⁵

Dissuasion is but one tool available to policy makers in shaping the international security environment. Others include appeasement, assurance, deterrence and coercion. Collectively, these strategies can be seen as part of a continuum, extending from appeasement at the least aggressive end, to active war at the most aggressive end. All of these strategies can be employed actively or passively, they may be used simultaneously against the same target. Each strategy is briefly defined below:

1. **Appeasement**

Appeasement is the act of granting concessions to promote good relations between states. Despite routine use in diplomatic interaction, the term appeasement, “is the political equivalent of a swear word,” Daniel Moran writes, “...to accuse someone of appeasement is to associate him or her with a historical episode [Munich] whose meaning is thought to be beyond dispute, and whose lessons are so plain that only a fool could fail

⁵ Quadrennial Defense Review, 19.

to heed them.”⁶ The conventional wisdom that “appeasement only leads to more aggression” is an article of faith in American policy circles, but a more thoughtful examination reveals that in certain circumstances appeasement can be an effective policy. Granting concessions and conciliation toward adversaries must be a part of diplomatic discourse; if this were not the case, all state interaction would end in war. In the nineteenth century, for instance, Great Britain appeased Washington by granting territorial concessions along the northern border of the United States, which allowed Britain to re-deploy military forces to home waters in order to meet the looming German threat.

2. Assurance

Assurance, whether informal or by treaty, is used to support allies and friends, most often by offering a pledge of military or diplomatic help when needed. Assurance is closely associated with extended deterrence, as in the extension of the U.S. nuclear deterrence umbrella over Western Europe during the Cold War. Today, assurance plays an important role in calming fears among America’s allies in Asia, especially when North Korea rattles their nuclear arsenal.

3. Deterrence

Deterrence threatens force in response to aggressive acts. Deterrence attempts to convince an adversary that the costs of perusing a particular course of action outweigh the benefits; that action x will result in retaliation y, which will be more painful than any benefit accrued. Deterrence may be undertaken as a long-term strategic policy, as in the case of nuclear deterrence against Russia, or it may be applied to immediate crisis situations, such as the stationing of two U.S. carrier battle groups in the South China Sea during the 1996 Taiwan Straights Crisis.

While deterrence is related to dissuasion, the key difference lies in the intended target. Deterrence is the effort to prevent an opponent from using existing capabilities to undertake some undesirable policy or action; dissuasion is the effort to prevent an

⁶ Daniel Moran, “Appeasement,” *Strategic Insights* Vol. 2 (April 2003): 1. Available from <http://www.ccc.nps.mil/si/apr03/strategy.asp> (accessed April 2006).

adversary or potential adversary from taking steps to obtain threatening capabilities, or to undertake policies that will be harmful to U.S. interests in the future.

4. Coercion

Coercion or compulsion strategies use active military force, short of war, to achieve policy objectives by forcing a weaker foe to yield. To use a term currently out of vogue—for a policy still very much still in use—coercion is “gunboat diplomacy.” Author James Cable lists over 175 instances of the use of force in situations short of war between 1945 and 1991, including the U.S. ejection of Cuban forces from Granada in 1981, and the Royal Navy’s aggressive escort of British trawlers during the Cod Wars with Iceland in the 1970s.⁷ Coercion—most often used by stronger nations against weaker states—is fraught with danger and unintended consequences, and hence must be used carefully. A key consideration when contemplating coercion is the correlation of forces. As Cable points out, placing naval squadrons off the shores of the collapsing Soviet Union in 1991 to take advantage of whatever opportunities that came up, as the Royal Navy did in 1919 off the coasts of the collapsing Russian state, would have likely been a disastrous move due to the considerable military power the USSR still possessed.⁸

5. Dissuasion

Dissuasion seeks to influence states and non-state actors in directions positive to U.S. interests. Dissuasion can be aimed at behavior (such as challenging the United States for sea-control) or capabilities (such as WMD programs or threatening conventional forces). It is normally directed against future capabilities or behaviors—the goal is to persuade others that an alternative course is better than one that ends in threatening behaviors or capabilities. While a deterrence strategy is intended for current threats, dissuasion seeks to influence the future security environment. Dissuasion may occur alongside other strategies such as deterrence or coercion, but it also may *use* deterrence and coercion as part of an overall framework of dissuasion aimed at convincing the target to adopt a path acceptable to the United States. An example of this

⁷ James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 159-213.

⁸ Ibid.

is the effort to dissuade Libya from pursuing nuclear weapons, which used punitive strikes (coercion), and threats of massive retaliation (deterrence) as part of the overall dissuasive effort.

C. PUTTING DISSUASION IN CONTEXT

This thesis explores how to operationalize a policy of dissuasion. Outside of broad prescriptions, there are few published procedures for actually implementing the concept of dissuasion. Indeed, the understanding of dissuasion as a defined strategy is in its infancy, even though it has been in actual routine use throughout history. Today, U.S. strategists find themselves in a position analogous to the situation in 1945 with the then emerging strategy of deterrence. In effect, we are “present at the creation.” From this perspective, it is easy to understand why the literature on dissuasion theory is quite limited.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) of March 2005 emphasizes the importance of influencing events before they become threats. According to the NDS, the first Strategic Objective is to secure the United States from direct attack by giving “top priority to dissuading, deterring and defeating those who seek to harm the United States...” The NDS also states that, “We will work to dissuade potential adversaries from adopting threatening capabilities, methods and ambitions, particularly by developing our own key military advantages.”⁹ In contrast to conventional deterrence, dissuasion will be used in a proactive effort to persuade potential adversaries not to adopt threatening policies or build threatening capabilities in the first place. Despite repeatedly invoking dissuasion as a strategy, however, the NDS is silent on how to implement the concept.

Academic literature on dissuasion generally falls into one of three categories: Defining dissuasion, dissuasion campaigns aimed at specific targets, and the first tentative attempts to explain how dissuasion can be systematically implemented.

⁹ Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (March 2005).

In the first category, author Richard Kugler discusses the complementary nature of dissuasion and deterrence in his article entitled “Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept.” He traces the roots of dissuasion to the Great Power politics of the nineteenth century, and its rebirth as a concept in the post-Cold War security environment. Kugler sees the great value of dissuasion as a moderator on behavior:

The main attraction of dissuasion is that while it is not always easy or inexpensive, it can inhibit otherwise tough-minded countries from going over the edge in their foreign policies and defense strategies. It can help prevent them from not only competing with the United States militarily but also from menacing our allies, seeking to dismantle our collective security arrangements, and striving to impose new geopolitical arrangements that damage American interests and values.¹⁰

Dissuasion relies on “stable, favorable force balances in key theaters,” according to Kugler. Potential adversaries must be convinced that the cost of challenging the United States will far exceed any benefit. This will require continuous strategic adjustment on the part of the United States, especially in light of the rapid nature of societal and military transformation overseas. While Krugler’s analysis is valuable, it errs by assuming that dissuasion must be non-confrontational to be effective; to the contrary, the three case studies show that dissuasion can be actively aggressive, using the full spectrum of national power to meet policy objectives.

M. Elaine Bunn discusses the unsettled nature of dissuasion as a tool of U.S. defense policy.¹¹ Selecting a narrow definition of dissuasion as “discouraging military aspects of competition, or channeling threats in certain directions—rather than the broader interpretation of demotivating threatening ambitions in the first place,” she explores a variety of potential strategies, but cautions that a particular strategy used to dissuade one threat may promote the emergence of a different threat. Bunn points to the U.S. advantage in research and development, engineering, and existing sophisticated and powerful military forces as compelling dissuasive tools—by imposing overwhelming costs on potential rivals, an insurmountable barrier to initial entry is erected. Bunn also

¹⁰ Richard Kugler, “Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept,” *Strategic Forum* No. 196 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2002): 10.

¹¹ Elaine Bunn, “Force Posture and Dissuasion,” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 3 (2004). Available from, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/index.asp#archive> (accessed April 2006).

addresses the many unanswered questions with regard to dissuasion, such as: How should dissuasion inform U.S. force capabilities decisions? How best to leverage our R&D and engineering advantages for dissuading potential rivals? Where in the U.S. government should dissuasion goals and policy be formulated? And finally, what affect will openly discussing dissuasion goals have on the “dissuadee?” Other authors disagree with Bunn’s narrowing of dissuasion to exclude “demotivating threatening ambitions in the first place,” and the historical record demonstrates that dissuading undesirable aspirations is quite possible.

In the second category, some literature narrows the discussion of dissuasion to specific adversaries (or potential adversaries) and categories of threat. These scholars focus on WMD, terrorists/non-state actors, and various states such as Russia and Pakistan. Chuck Lutes and Scott Sagan address the role of dissuasion in preventing the spread and use of WMD.¹² Sagan aligns the goals of dissuasion in the National Security Strategy with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but states that the logic underlying dissuasion is contrary to that of the NPT: The NPT requires the United States to work in good faith toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, while dissuasion logically requires overwhelming nuclear superiority as a cost-prohibitive barrier to foreign nuclear competition with the United States. He also points to the illogic in National Security documents which postulate that “rogue states” disregard deterrence in their drive to obtain WMD, but will somehow be persuaded by more subtle dissuasion. However, this view again consigns dissuasion into a too limited category of purely non-threatening strategies. Lutes places dissuasion in the context of the three pillars of counter-WMD strategies (counter-proliferation, non-proliferation, and consequence management) by highlighting the role of passive and active defenses, focusing on barriers to entry and reducing the cost-benefit calculus of potential adversaries.

¹² Scott Sagan, “Dissuasion and the NPT Regime: Complementary or Contradictory Strategies?” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 3 (2004). Available from, <http://www.ccc.nps.mil/si/index.asp#archive> (accessed May 2006); and Chuck Lutes, “The role of Dissuasion in Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 3 (2004). Available from <http://www.ccc.nps.mil/si/index.asp#archive> (accessed February 2006).

Joseph Pilat adds to the descriptions of the nature and functioning of dissuasion by identifying a dissuasion motive—negative consequences¹³ Pilat’s focuses not on dissuading terrorists from overall terrorist behavior, but on dissuading them from certain select actions, such as the use of weapons of mass destruction. His techniques boil down to “draining the swamp” strategies of soft power, aggressive interdiction of materials and finished weapons, and (potentially coercive) influencing of sponsoring states and non-state actors.

Dissuasion of specific states is explored by Feroz Hassan Khan and Christopher Clary, John Gill, and James Goldgeier.¹⁴ Using Pakistan as an example, Khan and Clary highlight the difficulty of dissuading states more concerned with regional security issues than in cooperating with the United States. The close Pakistani-U.S. relationship in the 1950s and extensive economic and political pressure applied by Washington had little impact on Pakistani preoccupation with the Indian nuclear program. Today, any effort at dissuading Pakistan will likely be overwhelmed by the urgency of fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and Pakistan’s continued rivalry with India. Gill reinforces Khan and Clary’s general conclusion, but through a detailed examination of the history of U.S./Pakistan/India relations, he finds some modest successes for dissuasion. He believes dissuasion is most likely to work when very senior personal diplomacy is used in a multi-nation framework. Goldgeier draws lessons from the mixed success the United States has had in dissuading unwanted Soviet and Russian behaviors and capabilities since 1945. His analysis of various episodes yields the following points:

- With ideological foes, the best that one is likely to do is deterrence, rather than dissuasion.
- Incentives must be larger than the benefits the targeted country is being asked to forego.

¹³ Joseph Pilat, “Dissuasion of Terrorists and Other Non-State Actors,” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 3 (2004). Available from, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/index.asp#archive> (accessed April 2006).

¹⁴ Feroz Khan and Christopher Clary, “Dissuasion and Regional Allies: The Case of Pakistan,” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 3 (2004). Available from, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/index.asp#archive> (accessed April 2006); John Gill, “Dissuasion and Confrontation: U.S. Policy in India-Pakistan Crisis,” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 3 (2004). Available from, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/index.asp#archive> (accessed April 2006); and James Goldgeier, “Dissuasion in America’s Russian Policy,” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 3 (2004). Available from <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/index.asp#archive> (accessed April 2006).

- Incentives must be satisfactory to powerful sub-state actors to be accepted by the state in question.
- U.S. officials must be able to actually deliver the incentives promised.

Goldgeier's points about ideology and sub-state actors reinforce one of the main themes of this thesis: The strategic culture of the target state has a tremendous influence on the success or failure of dissuasion.

In the final category—techniques for implementing dissuasion—Gregory Giles provides valuable insight by highlighting the difficulty of implementing dissuasion, but raises more questions than he answers. In addition to the questions previously raised by Bunn, Giles focuses on “What are the observables?” when evaluating dissuasion? Giles also brings up the planning and organizational challenges inherent in dissuasion for combatant commanders with limited analytical resources, especially in reactive planning.¹⁵

This survey of the existing literature demonstrates how tentative the security community’s grasp is on the dissuasion concept. Scholars struggle to define the blurry line between dissuasion and deterrence, and seek out instances where dissuasion has been applied long before it was formally enunciated. The focus on the efficacy of dissuasion as a non-threatening strategy completely misses that dissuasion is a *framework* for assembling a range of strategies—including aggressive coercion—to influence the target. The other glaring omission in the literature is the lack of methodology for applying dissuasion techniques to problems the United States will face in the future. This thesis fills the gap in this literature.

D. ROADMAP

This thesis moves dissuasion out the theoretical realm into the operational domain. Chapter II suggests methods for planning and utilizing a dissuasion strategy to meet real world goals. Common dissuasive tools are described (presence and engagement, controlling the spread of technology and arms, conditional support,

¹⁵ Gregory Giles, “Dissuasion: Conceptual, Planning, and Organizing Challenges for the U.S. Combatant Commands,” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 3 (2004). Available from, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/index.asp#archive> (accessed March 2006).

economic influence, and erecting barriers to effective competition), before a detailed discussion of the role of strategic culture is presented. Chapter II closes with a description of the use of naval forces in executing a dissuasion policy and makes force structure recommendations.

Chapter III through V present three historical case studies of dissuasion in the twentieth century: the United States effort to convince Libya to abandon pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); British attempts to dissuade Germany from building a rival battle fleet prior to World War I; and British operations in the Baltic in the period 1918–1921. Each chapter presents a historical narrative, an analysis of how dissuasion was used, and an extraction of lessons learned.

Chapter VI concludes this study by applying dissuasion to two current real-world issues facing the United States, and closes with policy recommendations.

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II. OPERATIONALZING DISSUASION

A. INTRODUCTION

Dissuasion as a strategy was first formally proposed in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. This is not to say that dissuasion has not been used prior to being defined in 2001; quite to the contrary, dissuasion has been applied frequently in the twentieth century in attempts to influence geopolitical rivals. The question of how dissuasion can be systematically implemented, however, has yet to be answered.

Dissuasion requires an ability to read what motivates the target. Is the target motivated by ideology? Economics? Domestic politics, local security concerns, or fear of the United States? In almost all cases, observable behavior is a complex mixture of reinforcing and opposing forces that, in the aggregate, produce a greater or lesser impetus to hew to a particular course. After analyzing the target's motives, appropriate dissuasive tools (presence and engagement, controlling the spread of technology and arms, conditional support, economic influence, and erecting barriers to effective competition) can be applied to dampen undesirable motivations and amplify those that tend to push behavior in a favorable direction.

This chapter provides an outline of how the strategy of dissuasion can be put into practice by national policy makers and operational commanders. First, a systematic approach to building a dissuasion strategy is developed, followed by an examination of the specific tools used to influence the target's behavior. Next, a detailed discussion of strategic culture is offered, emphasizing the absolute necessity of understanding the role it plays in the success or failure of dissuasion. Finally, the specific role of naval forces in implementing dissuasion is examined, and force structure recommendations are offered.

B. IMPLEMENTING DISSUASION

A conceptual framework for implementing dissuasion involves applying specific pressures (tools) to motivations (which can be thought as vectors) acting on the target's overall behavior. The goal is to amplify motives that move observed behavior in the desired direction, and attenuate motives that move behavior in an undesirable direction.

The case study on Libya's drive to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Chapter III, for example, demonstrates an intricate mixture of forces that either pushed the regime toward acquiring WMD or acted against that desire. Figure 2 provides a highly simplified view of this phenomenon:




Figure 2. Simplified View of Motivations Driving Aggregate Behavior Toward Acquisition of WMD

In the case of Libya, the United States used economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, punitive strikes, interdiction, and engagement over three decades, eventually dissuading Tripoli away from its drive toward the acquisition of WMD. Each action exerted specific pressures on one or more forces influencing Libya's desire to develop nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Figure 3 provides a simplified view of how dissuasion changed Libya path:




Figure 3. Nominal View of the Long Term Results of Dissuasion Policies on the Aggregate Behavior Toward the Drive to Acquire WMD.

Dissuading Libya used the entire spectrum of U.S. economic, military, and diplomatic power, illustrating the point that dissuasion uses other—often aggressive—strategies such as coercion for reaching the overall dissuasive goal. When seeking to apply dissuasion to real-world problems, the Libyan example also highlights the importance of understanding the targets strategic culture, and brings out some of the tools

that may be used to effect change. Considering the above as a framework, it is possible to formulate a systematic approach to operationalizing dissuasion:

- Define the behavior to be dissuaded and the desired behavior. Is the desired behavior within the range limits dictated by the target's strategic culture?
- Identify the forces (vectors) pushing the target's behavior toward and away from the undesirable behavior.
- Select and apply tools for amplifying positive forces (vectors) and attenuating negative forces.
- Continuously evaluate the effect dissuasion is having on the target.
- Adjust to meet changing circumstances.

The method described is no doubt overly mechanistic and simplistic, but it provides a mental framework for considering how dissuasion can be applied to real world problems.

C. TOOLS FOR DISSUASION

Methods of implementing a dissuasion policy include: Presence and engagement; controlling the spread of technology and arms; conditional promises of support and threats to withdraw support; building economic ties that promote influence; and erecting cost, technological, and 'human capital' barriers to effective competition. Each of these methods is discussed, below:

1. Presence and Engagement

Presence and engagement operations, which signals U.S. resolve to potential enemies and provides reassurance to allies, are the cornerstones of any dissuasion policy. Military and diplomatic engagement builds state-to-state relationships, while the presence of U.S. forces in a region, especially if permanently stationed there, indicates unambiguously American commitment to stability, and a willingness to defend vital interests. Allies draw reassurance, while potential foes must ponder the costs of challenging U.S. power. Recent examples include the positive effects of U.S. tsunami and earthquake relief efforts in the Indonesia and Pakistan. The favorable opinion of the

United States in Indonesia rose from an abysmal 15 percent in 2003 to 38 percent in 2005, almost entirely due to American relief efforts following the December 2004 tsunami.¹⁶ Following this improvement in the public view of the United States, Indonesia and the United States have begun to work on upgrading military-to-military contact and cooperation in the Global War on Terror, while civil relations between the two nations have also improved.

If presence and engagement send strong signals about a regions importance, a lack of presence or an observable reduction in presence sends the exact opposite signal. As Chief of Naval Operation Admiral Mike Mullins said, “[V]irtual presence is actual absence.”¹⁷

2. Controlling the Spread of Technology and Arms

A state may be dissuaded from pursuit of undesirable capabilities, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), by active and passive measures to prevent acquisition of technology, components, and finished arms and equipment. Arms control regimes, export controls, sanctions, interdiction, and blockade may all be used to meet policy goals. An example is the tight control of uranium enrichment technologies such as centrifuges, which may lead to a state to abandoning nuclear weapons development programs on the grounds that the end goal is unreachable. As demonstrated by the North Korean development of nuclear weapons, however, attempts to prevent the spread of technology may only slow the development of undesirable capabilities unless other strategies such as positive incentives also are used.

3. Conditional Support and Withdrawal of Support

Moral, economic, or military support to a state can be granted upon condition of desired behavior, and existing support can be withdrawn on the same grounds. Policy makers often offer tit-for-tat incentives to other states, seeking specific behaviors or modification of current behaviors in the targeted state. For example, the United States

¹⁶ Pew Global Attitudes Project (June 2005). Available from, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=247> (accessed January 2006).

¹⁷ Admiral Mike Mullins, remarks at the National Defense University, Washington DC, 16 August 2005. <http://www.navy.mil/palib/cno/speeches/mullen050816.txt>, (accessed January 2006).

recently offered support for India's nuclear program in exchange for placing the program under international controls and accepting deeper ties with Washington.

4. Building Influence through Economic Ties

Economic ties can provide dissuasive influence through direct pressure, such as embargo, or through the access to influential members of the target society. Exerting influence through wielding the economic sword is a tried-and-true method of persuading a state to adopt favorable policies: Prior to the American Revolutionary War, for example, the British government was forced to abandon the Stamp Act when influential British merchants began to feel the pinch from an American boycott of British goods. Economic influence can reach coercive proportions, as in the recent Russian use of natural gas pricing to influence the Ukrainian government. Arms sales are another means of exerting pressure, and can have influence disproportionate to their actual monetary value by promoting military-to-military contact, parts supply and upgrade deals, and training exchange programs.

5. Erecting Barriers to Effective Competition

Erecting high barriers to competition may dissuade a potential adversary from even attempting the contest. Barriers may take to form of an overwhelming lead in military force structure, a large technological lead, or an insurmountable lead in the area of “human capital.” Due to American domination of high-intensity conventional war, most adversaries will likely opt to seek asymmetric alternatives to conventional battle or pursue WMD programs. Brad Roberts cautions however, that cost barriers “may be effective for de-motivating certain types of military response, but it may likewise motivate other responses, either asymmetric military ones or a general desire to compete in order not to be taken advantage of.”¹⁸

The concept of a human capital barrier is often shortchanged in American strategic thought, which pays lip-service to the human factor in battle while banking on

¹⁸ Brad Roberts, “Dissuasion and China,” *Strategic Insights* Vol. 3 (2004). Available from, <http://www.ccc.nps.mil/si/2004/oct/robertsOct04.asp> (accessed December 2005).

technology to win the day.¹⁹ U.S. military advantages often actually lie in areas such as the ability to project sustainable military power to the far side of the world, or the ability to keep up around-the-clock fixed-wing aircraft operations from the deck of an aircraft carrier. These are *human* capabilities, not technological ones. Fixed-wing carrier aviation, for example, involves human infrastructure that extends back to dozens of state-side schools, elaborate training and evaluation programs, and procedures worked out over decades of operations. Activities as challenging as this can not be easily replicated, despite the relatively low-tech nature of the overall endeavor—the Soviets worked for 30 years to establish a competitive carrier strike capability, and never succeeded. Much the same way as cost barriers can be established to prevent effective entry into the competition, human performance barriers also might be used to dissuade potential competitors from perusing certain paths. These human capital barriers take two forms: they can be in the form of an insurmountable barrier, such as the carrier aviation example, or they can be in the form of a deliberate imposition of a human capital cost, by forcing competitors to use expensively trained personnel. For instance, the Chinese are apparently working on using ballistic missiles to target ships at sea. The traditional method of countering this would be to invest in high-technology kinetic weapons. Another route, one that erects a human capital barrier, would be to develop countermeasures that force the Chinese to put a highly trained man in-the-loop for terminal targeting of these ballistic missiles, thus erecting a barrier to development and deployment.

D. DISSUASION AND STRATEGIC CULTURE

Strategic Culture is the collective weight of national history, societal symbols, national “character,” government system, and founding myths within a society. It acts to limit strategic choice and rank strategic preferences among decision makers, thus influencing the course of international affairs. Understanding the role that strategic culture plays in limiting and ranking the options available to policymakers is vital to successfully implementing dissuasion.

¹⁹ Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

1. Introduction to Strategic Culture

According to Alistair Johnston, strategic culture exerts its influence on society through consensus perceptions of the strategic environment and the efficacy of force:

Strategic culture is an integrated “system of symbols”...which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting preferences by formulating concepts on the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious... Thus strategic culture comprises two parts: the first consists of basic assumptions about the orderliness of the strategic environment, that is, about the role of war in human affairs (whether it is inevitable or an aberration), about the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses...and about the efficacy of the use of force... The second part consists of assumptions at a more operational level about what strategic options are the most efficacious for dealing with the threat environment.²⁰

Strategic preferences in a given society tend to be deeply rooted in historical experience, political customs, military culture, and geography. Thus, preferences are ranked by strategic culture, while some options are completely eliminated. As an illustration of the power of strategic culture using the United States as an example, deterrence theorist Colin Gray has argued that the unique American historical experience produces “modes of thought and action with respect to force, [resulting in a set of] dominant national beliefs.” America, Gray believes, tends toward messianic and crusading warfare, rooted in the moralism of the founding of the Republic that includes a rather unique belief that war is an aberration in human affairs.²¹

Antulio Echevarria further describes the powerful effect strategic culture can have on strategic decision making, using what he terms the “American way of war” as an example. The American way of war focuses on aggressive, direct, and decisive victory in battle—in essence, American thinking equates winning battles with winning the war, and that objectives are met exclusively through destruction of the enemy. This thinking is endemic to American political-military culture due to the deeply ingrained tradition of military subordination to civilian authority that began with Washington’s Farewell Address: military professionals should concentrate on winning battles, while politicians

²⁰ Alastair Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” *International Security* 19, (Spring 1995): 32.

²¹ Gray quoted in Ibid., 36.

should focus on the diplomatic struggles that precede and follow war. Americans view war as a violent *alternative* to politics and an aberration in human affairs—not a continuation of politics as Clausewitz believes. This mental divide between peace and war has profound implications in how strategic decisions are made in Washington, perhaps most recently in the decisions about how to handle the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Echevarria points out that American planning, following the strategic culture script, ended at the destruction of the old regime in Iraq, rather than concentrating on the strategic goal of establishing a new stable and democratic state.²²

If strategic culture is deeply rooted in history, do recent historical events have an impact? To have any meaning at all, strategic culture must be fairly inelastic and immune to change, yet consideration must be made for seismic events like the Vietnam experience or 9/11. In fact, cataclysmic events can have a significant impact on the strategic culture, but even in the midst of radical change culture tends to “stay with what it knows,” drawing on an alternative historical narrative to put new threats in perspective (as in the frequent comparison of the 9/11 attack with Pearl Harbor). For example, the United States pursued an essentially internationalist policy in the Cold War, drawing on the experience of World War II that emphasized alliance partnerships and collective decision making. John Lewis Gaddis writes, however, that the demise of the Soviet Union and the events of September 11, 2001, have brought to the fore older American traditions of unilateralism and preemption.²³ Turning to another example, Johnston identifies two strands of Chinese strategic culture, which he labels “Parabellum (or realpolitik)” and “Confucian-Mencian.” The Confucian-Mencian strand is currently inoperative and exists only as an “idealized discourse” in Chinese politics and strategy.²⁴ Taking into account the American experience above, perhaps a better way to view the Confucian-Mencian strand of strategic culture is as *dormant* rather than inoperative, simply waiting for the right conditions for it to resurface and gain prominence. In short,

²² Antulio Echevarria, *Toward an American Way of War* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2004).

²³ For an excellent discussion of the historical roots of current U.S. foreign policy, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2004).

²⁴ Andrew Scobell, “Strategic Culture and China: IR Theory Versus the Fortune Cookie?” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 4 (2005). Available from, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Oct/scobellOct05.asp> (accessed March 2006).

strategic culture can change quickly under the right circumstances, switching to an alternate (perhaps dormant) narrative, as is the case identified by Gaddis for American strategic culture.

Other pressures act to change strategic culture over time (or act to restrain change). These include domestic pressures (interest groups, competing ideologies, media, bureaucracy, etc.), international pressures (prevailing international regimes, emerging or receding threats, etc.), and technological change. This last factor merits a little more explanation, due the controversial assessment of technology's role in strategic culture literature. Perhaps the best illustration of the role technology plays in strategic culture is to be found in the changes wrought by precision guided munitions (PGM) and computer networks on the American style of warfare, which emerged in the 1990s. Drawing on the terminology of complexity theory and air power, this new way emphasized speed, jointness, omniscient knowledge, and precision. It promised quick results, few American casualties, and minimal collateral damage. This "war on-the-cheap" stepped away from the Vietnam-inspired Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force, making wars for less-than-vital interests far more acceptable to strategic decision makers than in the past, by promising low-cost victory.²⁵ In the wake of 9/11, Americans seem willing to return to the more traditionally aggressive style of warfare—even if it means significant U.S. casualties—while the experience of urban fighting in the streets of Iraq is prompting a reevaluation of the air- and computer-centric approach to warfare.

Capability—especially military capability—changes strategic culture in a feedback loop—if you have a hammer in your hand, all problems start to look like nails. Those with a powerful military are far more likely to select strategic options that include the use of force than states with no power-projection capability. A fine example of how the military instrument can change strategic culture is offered by the American naval build-up of the late nineteenth century: In the 1890s, the United States built a blue-water battleship navy for a variety of unfocused reasons, few of which had to do with actual national defense. The nation—fired by a sense of Manifest Destiny—found itself with a new instrument of power, and began to look outward for a place to use it. In April 1898,

²⁵ Echevarria, 8-12.

America went to war with Spain over Cuban independence. By August, the United States found itself in possession of an empire in the far Pacific and the Caribbean. In the words of A.T. Mahan, the war “...shattered national ideas deep rooted in the prepossessions of the century, and planted the United States in Asia, face to face with the great problems of the immediate future.”²⁶

Another element that shapes strategic culture is the role of “touchstone” events that achieve a unique prominence in strategic discourse and decision making. Words or phrases such as “appeasement” or “Vietnam quagmire” are accorded an almost talisman-like quality, evoking an entire framework of historical experience through which current events are viewed. As Daniel Moran writes, “Appeasement...is the political equivalent of a swear word...whose lessons are so plain that only a fool could fail to heed them.”²⁷ Simply uttering the aphorism, “appeasement only leads to more aggression” acts to limit discourse by placing certain options out-of-bounds, thereby limiting strategic alternatives. Frequently, however, these touchstone events are invoked incorrectly. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May illustrate this phenomenon perfectly when assessing the decision making around the Korean War. President Truman correctly raised the specter of appeasement when making his decision to defend Korea in 1950, but later misapplied the lessons of Munich when considering if he should allow General MacArthur to continue pushing up the peninsula into North Korea.²⁸

The Korea example also illustrates another important point when considering the role of strategic culture in a crisis: who the decision makers are matters a great deal. Short term crisis-driven decision making may be held to a very select group of people that may or, may not, share in the collective biases of the larger society’s strategic culture. In the case of the decision to defend Korea, the decision making group was really a group of one: President Truman, isolated far from Washington in his hometown of Independence, Missouri. Longer term decisions, such as the decision to prosecute the

²⁶ George Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1996), 36.

²⁷ Daniel Moran, “Appeasement,” *Strategic Insights* Vol. 3 (2003). Available from, <http://www.ccc.nps.mil/si/apr03/strategy.asp> (accessed February 2006).

²⁸ Richard Neustadt and Richard May, *Thinking In Time* (NY: Free Press. 1988), 34-49.

Cold War embodied in the 1950 NSC-68 memorandum,²⁹ are subject to a greater degree of strategic culture induced selectivity than those decisions made by small elites in a moment of crisis.

Strategic culture theory is a superstructure built upon a neorealist edifice—it assumes states will act in realist fashion to maximize advantage within the international system, with the caveat that perceived choices are limited and ranked by cultural bias. States can, however, have radically different goals for themselves, ranging from mere survival to hegemonic domination. States perusing hegemonic domination will be more prone to select aggressive strategies than those who seek simple survival.

To summarize, strategic culture is inherently resistant to change, but *can* change under the pressure from international events, technology, and domestic factors, often conforming to a previously dormant strategic tradition. The twin factors of the operative strategic culture and strategic goals interact to rank and limit the strategic choices available to decision makers. These preferences will tend to be pushed in aggressive directions if strategic goals are more ambitious than mere survival. Figure 4 illustrates:

²⁹ Michael Hogan, *A Cross of Iron* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 265-76.




Figure 4. Conceptual Diagram of Strategic Culture

2. The Role of Strategic Culture in Dissuasion

Given the role of strategic culture in limiting strategic choices, dissuasion must only attempt to push state behavior in a direction supported by the target's strategic culture. James Goldgeier believes that with ideological foes, the most that one is likely to accomplish is deterrence, rather than dissuasion, and that some states may simply refuse to be dissuaded. Goldgeier points out that positive incentives offered to the Soviets had

little or no effect until Moscow gave up its *ideological* struggle with the West.³⁰ The implication is that the strategic culture of the Soviets limited the potential range of strategic options open to consideration by the Soviet leadership. American attempts at dissuasion that sought a reaction outside of that range were doomed to failure.

Dissuasion must be continuously evaluated *in situ*. A key component of strategic culture is military capability—changes in capability prompt changes in strategic culture. For example, the strategic culture of the United States changed considerably in the late nineteenth century when it acquired a ocean-going battle fleet, moving from an insular outlook to a more aggressive “imperial” outlook relatively quickly. Thus, a dissuasion strategy formulated to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), for instance, will not work to subsequently persuade the target to *give up* its weapons once it has successfully acquired them: the strategic culture of the target state will be changed by new WMD capabilities, in turn changing the range of strategic choices available to the target state’s decision makers.³¹ Strategic culture is a light that must be cast continuously on the strategy of dissuasion if there is to be any hope of success.

If strategic culture acts to limit policy options, then dissuasion policy must take into account the *potential* range of actions available to the target state, as perceived through the lens of target state’s strategic culture. Any dissuasion strategy that seeks to force a state onto a path *outside* of this range will likely end in failure. When considering the intersection of strategic culture and strategies such as dissuasion, deterrence, or coercion, it is useful to visualize each as opening up a different range of *perceived available responses* in the mind of the target. One can readily see that dissuasion may encourage a different range of options in the mind of the target than a powerful military-led coercion policy will open up. This point is illustrated by Figure 2:

³⁰ James Goldgeier “Dissuasion in America’s Russia Policy,” *Strategic Insights* Vol. 3 (2004). Available from, <http://www.ccc.nps.mil/si/2004/oct/goldgeierOct04.asp> (accessed January 2006).

³¹ For a discussion of the need to adjust dissuasion strategies to where exactly a state is in the WMD acquisition cycle, see Chuck Lutes, “The Role of Dissuasion in Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *Strategic Insights* Vol. 3 (2004). Available from, <http://www.ccc.nps.mil/si/2004/oct/lutesOct04.asp> (accessed February 2006).




Figure 5. Notional Target Response to the Application of Selected Strategies,
Dictated by the Target’s Strategic Culture

3. Summing Up the Role of Strategic Culture

A dissuasion strategy must account for the strategic culture of the target. Failure to take into account the likely response of the target, as dictated by strategic culture, dooms the operation from the start. The changing nature of the target’s strategic culture (in response to perceived threats, opportunities, increased capabilities, and other pressures) also must be continuously evaluated and measured against the likely response to the ongoing dissuasion operation.

E. DISSUASION WITH NAVAL FORCES

Naval forces are particularly suited to dissuasion: Presence and engagement operations are practiced by navies on a daily basis. Controlling the spread of technology and arms through blockade and inspection regimes are also missions naval forces are familiar with. Naval forces encourage economic ties through assuring freedom of the seas, and the complexity of naval arms further promote close ties when sold to other states. Erecting technological and human capital barriers in the maritime arena can be as effective as anywhere else, especially given the enormous lead the U.S. Navy enjoys over any potential competitor (competing in submarine technology, for instance, can impose enormous costs on an adversary). This section examines the specific role maritime forces can play in implementing the six dissuasion tools (presence and engagement, controlling

the spread of technology and arms, conditional support, economic influence, and barriers to competition), and the force structure that best supports dissuasion.

1. Naval Forces and Dissuasive Tools

Naval forces have an important role to play in implementing the various dissuasive tools. A discussion of each of the five tools and the specific capabilities maritime forces bring to bear follows.

a. Naval Forces in Presence and Engagement

Naval forces routinely practice engagement through port visits, exchange of personnel, bi-lateral exercises, and security cooperation partnerships. They can also transition quickly to more direct strategies, such as coercion, and prepare the environment for follow-on joint forces. The strategic mobility of naval forces provides a unique capability for implementing dissuasion, while being far less provoking than ground forces. In an era when small disturbances can have an enormous impact on oil prices and seaborne trade, the presence of U.S. maritime forces in a region indicates American commitment to stability and a willingness to defend vital interests. Presence dissuades illicit use of the “global commons” on the high seas for piracy, terrorism, and illegal trafficking in arms, weapons technology, and humans. Naval presence applies deterrent pressure and provides a ready force to address problems before they harden into major crises.

b. Naval Forces and Controlling the Spread of Technology and Arms

A state may be dissuaded from pursuing certain avenues by limiting its access to technologies, particularly military technologies. Methods include international treaty, embargo and sanctions, inspection regimes, and blockade. Naval forces offer policy makers a spectrum of options for controlling the spread of technology and arms, from full maritime blockade to searching selected cargoes after intelligence cuing, such as the successful interdiction of uranium enrichment equipment bound for Libya under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), discussed in detail in Chapter III.

c. Using Naval Forces to Influence through Conditional Support and Withdrawal of Support

Naval units may influence a state's policies by provide direct military support upon agreed conditions, or threatened withdrawal of existing support if behavior does not change. For example, the frequent demonstrations by U.S. Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) in the vicinity of the Taiwan Straights that deter China could also work to prevent a Taiwanese move toward independence if it was made known to Taipei that CSGs would be withdrawn if Taiwan "rocks the boat." The British Royal Navy played a prominent role in the formation of the Baltic States using multiple instances of conditional support and the threatened withdrawal of support to push behavior in desired directions.

d. Building Influence through Economic Ties

Naval arms sales, due to the inherent complexity and enormous "sunk cost" nature of the product, offer potential influence through military-to-military contact, parts supply, upgrade deals, and training exchange programs. Often, these relationships provide an avenue of entrée into foreign governments, allowing U.S. policy makers an opportunity to exert influence at multiple levels. Additionally, the U.S. Navy is the global guarantee of the freedom of the seas that underpins world trade, promoting the economic interdependence that gives the United States considerable influence overseas.

e. Erecting Cost, Technological, and Human Capital Barriers with Naval Forces

Erecting barriers to competition is an attempt to dissuade the adversary from even attempting the contest by presenting overwhelming superiority. One area the U.S. enjoys enormous superiority in is the maritime domain—the U.S. Navy is larger than the next seventeen navies combined.³² Carefully maintenance of this overwhelming naval edge will likely dissuade any potential rival from undertaking a naval building

³² Robert Work, *Winning the Race: A Naval Fleet Platform Architecture for Enduring Maritime Supremacy*. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2005).

program designed to challenge the United States on the high seas (although a state may be tempted to seek local superiority through development of denial systems such as mines and coastal submarines).

2. Naval Force Structures to Support Dissuasion

A navy optimized to support the dissuasion tools outlined above must be flexible and scalable, without sacrificing the ability to fight a war at sea. Analyzing the role maritime forces play in each of the dissuasive tools leads one to the conclusion that the Navy should seek a mutually supporting high/medium/low mix of forces.

Engagement and presence require a broad spectrum of forces. At the high end, powerful battle-force ships—such as big-deck aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, strike-capable large surface combatants, and amphibious ships—are needed to influence events ashore and transition to full combat operations, if needed. At the far end of the spectrum, riverine forces, construction battalions, and civil affairs teams, capable of operating far inland are required. In the middle ground between these two sets of forces, however, a significant gap exists in the existing forces structure of the Navy. Large blue water units are often simply too big and complex to operate effectively with small navies grappling with local security concerns such as piracy and counterterrorism, nor are expensive combatants available in sufficient numbers to maintain an adequate presence at all but the most important of hot spots. There are many areas of the world—such as the Gulf of Guinea, where Nigerian oil is pumped and on-loaded for transshipment or Indonesian waters, through which pass 30 percent of the world’s trade—where dissuasion can best be supported by a continuous presence of smaller naval units suited to interoperating with local forces. Ships capable of filling the “medium” role in a high/medium/low mix should be physically robust, capable of self-deploying to austere ports for extended periods of time, and relatively inexpensive. A Patrol Corvette to fill this need could be based on a trawler design, or perhaps on one of the Atlantic fishery patrol vessels, such as the Royal Navy’s \$50 million *River*-class, 1,800-ton, Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV), capable of transiting 5,500 nm with an embarked helicopter.³³

³³ For a closer look at the *River*-class OPV, see the Navy Matters website, <http://navy-matters.beedall.com/opvh.htm> (accessed June 2006).

A high/medium/low mix of forces also supports the other tools of dissuasion (and other strategies): Low and medium mix forces are well suited to controlling the spread of threatening arms and technology through inspection, interdiction, and surveillance, while the high end of the mix can enforce blockade, if necessary. All three levels can be used in various scenarios of conditional support, and the medium and upper end of the ship mix promote economic influence if sold or deeded to foreign navies. The upper end of the mix—nuclear aircraft carriers, submarines, and large surface warships—contribute uniquely to the overwhelming U.S. lead in conventional combat power: maintaining this barrier to competition must be our first priority.

Naval forces should be considered the instrument of choice for operationalizing dissuasion due to their flexibility, strategic mobility, and the ability to exert the right pressure at the right place and time. Each of the case studies that follow in Chapters III through V demonstrates the use of naval forces in dissuasion.

F. CONCLUSION

Operationalizing dissuasion requires analyzing the strategic culture and other factors influencing target behavior, then tailoring specific policies to exert pressure on those factors. Naval forces offer policy makers particularly effective means of implementing the tools of dissuasion.

A final thought must be given to the total effect of dissuasion. The actions of the United States—and in particular the actions of the U.S. military—are intensively scrutinized by friend and foe around the world. Careful consideration of the consequences of a dissuasion strategy beyond the target is required. M. Elaine Bunn provides a concrete example in “Force Posture and Dissuasion:”

Country X may look at U.S. willingness to go into Iraq (when the U.S. Government believed Iraq had chemical weapons) and conclude that the cost of starting down or continuing down the path of WMD acquisition is just too risky and not worth it. Some argue this is what happened in the case of Libya (though there is debate about Qadaffi’s motives and we may never know for sure how much the war in Iraq factored into this). On the other hand, country Y or Z may look at the same Iraq situation, and conclude that the only way to protect itself against being “Saddam-ized” is to acquire WMD. Some say this is precisely or partly what is motivating

North Korea, which may have been reinforced by Operation Iraqi Freedom in its determination to acquire nuclear weapons for regime survival. Iran is also showing every sign of being determined to go forward, rather than being dissuaded.³⁴

The techniques outlined in this chapter—along with traditional strategies such as deterrence and coercion—can be used by policy makers to change the behavior of groups and states if intelligently and consistently applied. The three case studies that follow will show how other states have attempted to incorporate dissuasion into their foreign policy and military operations.

³⁴ M. Elaine Bunn, “Force Posture and Dissuasion,” in *Strategic Insights* Vol. 3 (2004). Available from, <http://www.ccc.nps.mil/si/2004/oct/bunnOct04.asp> (accessed March 2006).

III. DISSUADING CAPABILITIES CASE STUDY: LIBYAN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS

A. INTRODUCTION

In December 2003, Libya announced to the world that it would dismantle its nuclear and chemical weapons programs and immediately allow international weapons inspectors into the country. Seeking to end almost three decades of political and economic isolation, Libya pledged to eliminate all nuclear and chemical weapons programs, submit to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, do away with all ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 300 kilometers and payloads of greater than 500 kilograms, and to destroy all existing chemical weapons stocks.³⁵ Several months earlier, in August of 2003, Libya had formally accepted “responsibility for the actions of its officials” in the bombing of Pam Am Flight 103 over Lockerby, Scotland. It agreed to compensate the families of the victims with some \$10 million each, and handed over two indicted suspects (Libyan intelligence agents Adb al-Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifah Fhalifh) for trial at The Hague. Libya also agreed to pay \$170 million to the families of the UTA Flight 772 bombing over Niger in 1989, after a French court convicted six Libyans for complicity in the airliner’s destruction.³⁶

In addition to the decommissioning of Libya’s WMD programs, the events of 2003 marked the completion of Libya’s movement away from support of terrorist organizations, which began in the late-1990s with the closing of the notorious desert training camps that had hosted such organizations as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Libya’s sincerity had been reinforced in the minds of western leaders when Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi roundly condemned the 9/11 attacks and quietly began providing intelligence to the United States and cooperating with counter-terrorism efforts.³⁷

³⁵ Sharon Squassoni and Andrew Feicker. *CRS Report for Congress: Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2004), 2.

³⁶ Christopher Boucek. “Libya’s Return to the Fold?” *Strategic Insights* Vol. 3 (2004). Available from, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/mar/boucekMar04.asp> (accessed February 2006).

³⁷ Jon Alterman. “The Unique Libyan Case,” *Middle East Quarterly*, no. 13 (2006): 21-9.

What prompted Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi to give up his long pursuit of WMD and support for international terrorism? Although the term “dissuasion” was not formally identified as a strategy until 2001, the three-decade long U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military effort aimed at persuading Libya to abandon state-sponsored terrorism and pursuit of WMD is a clear example of dissuasion in operation. Since the Reagan administration in the early 1980s, the United States has used tools such as technology embargoes, international sanctions, interdiction of weapons components, punitive attacks, and finally, engagement and incentives, to dissuade Libya from support of international terrorism and WMD. In 2003, Washington’s long-term strategy paid off when Libya renounced its WMD program. This case study examines the thirty year struggle between Washington and Tripoli as a means of illuminating the larger question of how to operationalize dissuasion strategies elsewhere.

How did dissuasion achieve U.S. goals in the Libyan case? What did, and did not, work? What lessons can be applied to other situations faced by the United States, and which lessons are unique to the Libyan case? This chapter examines the sometimes inadvertent dissuasion strategy used against Libya, revealing that successful dissuasion requires the broadest possible application of combined diplomatic, economic, and military power. Other important insights include how counter-productive harsh rhetoric such as calls for “regime change” can be, the importance of engagement to build trust, and the necessity of understanding the strategic culture of the state in question. First, the history of Libyan-U.S. relations is examined, followed by an analysis of the effectiveness of dissuasion strategies as applied to Libya, and finally, a summary of lessons learned from this case study is offered.

B. BACKGROUND: LIBYA’S TROUBLED HISTORY OF TERRORISM SUPPORT AND PURSUIT OF WMD

As with so many other issues in the twenty-first century, the roots of Libyan-American conflict lie in the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Initially, the United States did not oppose the 1969 coup led by Captain Muammar Al Qadhafi against the Libyan monarchy, since the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) presented itself as anti-Soviet—although ideologically pan-Arab and

socialist. This attitude began to change when the United States and Britain were forced to withdraw from their Libyan bases in 1970 (Wheelus Air Force Base was intended to support strategic strikes on the Soviet Union). Concern solidified into active opposition when Libya began to court the Soviet Union and ferment anti-western revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East in the early 1970s.³⁸

Libya, driven by the ideological fervor of Muammar Qadhafi, began promoting in the third world a political and economic alternative to both the capitalist West and the communist Soviet Union. Qadhafi believed that the third world should seek a path between Western liberal capitalism and communism, known as the “Third International Theory,” published in his three-volume *Green Book*. He also strongly opposed Israel and sought to position Libya as the leader of pan-Arabism. In order to gain influence with Arab states and oppose Western influence in the third world, Libya supported a wide variety of violent organizations (including the Red Army Faction, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Irish Republican Army) and was involved in rebel movements across Africa and the Middle East.³⁹ Qadhafi’s ideological belief in independence for the third world and his enmity for the West became the heart of Libya’s strategic culture. U.S. options for reconciliation by the mid-1970s were limited indeed.

By the end of the 1970s, Libya’s activities and ideological outlook hardened American opposition, which in turn pushed Libya increasingly into the Soviet orbit, further straining relations between Washington and Tripoli (although America continued to purchase oil well into the early 1980s).⁴⁰ Relations between Libya and the United States deteriorated to the point of rupture when the Reagan Administration became convinced that a series of terrorist attacks against American targets overseas were at the behest of Libyan agents or proxies—including the bombing of a west Berlin disco in 1986 that killed two U.S. servicemen and wounded 229 others. In 1986, Presidential Executive Orders 12543 and 12544 imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions on Libya, which were followed up by coercive air strikes against terrorism related targets in

³⁸ Christopher Blanchard. *CRS Report for Congress: Libya: Background and U.S. Relations*, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, January 2006), 2-6.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

Benghazi and Tripoli. The air strikes and other coercive actions—including aggressive operations by carrier battle groups in the Gulf of Sidra that resulted in several confrontations with Libyan aircraft—by themselves clearly failed to modify Libyan behavior: Libyan agents were complicit in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 and UTA-772 over the Sahara in 1989. Equally as clear, the sanctions imposed by the Regan administration failed to immediately dissuade Libya from pursuit of chemical and nuclear weapons, which included the development of a hardened underground chemical munitions complex at Tarhura.⁴¹

The isolation of Libya increased in 1991 when Libya lost its great power sponsor in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Absent the threat of a Soviet veto, the international community adopted UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 748, which imposed economic sanctions in response to Libyan resistance to the Pan Am-103 and UTA-772 investigations. In 1993, the Clinton administration successfully sponsored UNSCR-883, which further tightened sanctions. Unilaterally, the United States passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which sought to limit financial flows into Libya and Iran by imposing sanctions on any international company operating in the United States that invested in Iran or Libya, and expanded the target of sanctions to include Libyan WMD activities. Collectively, these U.S. and international sanctions regimes began to seriously affect the Libyan economy. Although the UN never imposed an oil embargo on Libya, it did ban the sale of any new oil production equipment (which in any event was based on American technology that been unavailable to Libya since the early 1980s). While other OPEC nations improved production capacity and grew rich, Libya's output slowly

⁴¹ Jaime Calabrese. “Carrots or Sticks? Libya and U.S. Efforts to Influence Rogue States,” *Strategic Insights* Vol. 3 (2004). Available from, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/nov/calabreseNOV04.asp> (accessed November 2005).

declined.⁴² Libya's long term economic distress caused by wide-ranging international sanctions would eventually become an important factor in the ultimate success of U.S. strategy.⁴³

While the sanctions regimes of the 1990s apparently only had limited success modifying Libya's *immediate* behavior with regard to support of terrorism (Libya did close their terrorist training camps in the late 90s, but refused to cooperate with the ongoing Pan Am-103 trial and investigation), it had little no effect dissuading Qadhafi from pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Kahn's illicit weapons trafficking network began negotiations to provide uranium enrichment equipment to Libya in 1997. In the waning months of that year, Libya acquired twenty "P-1" type centrifuges, and parts for the construction of another 200. Kahn also provided the designs for a nuclear warhead, reportedly based on the Chinese weapon from the 1960s.⁴⁴ In 2001 and 2002 Kahn delivered more centrifuges and uranium hexafluoride (a material needed to process highly enriched uranium) directly to Libya on Pakistani cargo planes.⁴⁵ Libya also maintained a significant ballistic missile arsenal, comprised of Soviet supplied 300-km range Scud Bs, and 600-km Scud Cs acquired from North Korea. Tripoli was also developing a 700-km missile called the Al Fatah, which suffered developmental problems due to international sanctions choking off supplies and technical knowledge.⁴⁶

While Libya continued work on its nuclear program, the Clinton administration began a slow shift towards a strategy of limited engagement with Libya. In exchange for handing over the two suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing, in 1998 the United States agreed to move the trial to a neutral country (the Netherlands) and began to ease

⁴² Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, *Interactive Annual Statistical Bulletin 2003*. Available from, <http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20Bulletin/interactive/2004/FileZ/Main.htm>, (accessed January 2006).

⁴³ Megan O'Sullivan, *Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism* (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2003). O'Sullivan provides a detailed discussion of the historical affect of sanctions, including the case of Libya.

⁴⁴ Squassoni and Feickert. 2-6.

⁴⁵ Bill Gertz. "Libyan Sincerity on Arms in Doubt," The Washington Times, 9 September 2004.

⁴⁶ Squassoni and Feickert, 2-6.

sanctions. The suspect handover, coupled with the closing of the desert terrorist training camps, gave the Clinton administration enough confidence in Libya's change of heart to refrain from objecting when the UN lifted sanctions.⁴⁷ These early steps toward engagement began to build a limited trust between Tripoli, and the British and American Governments.

The slow rapprochement between Libya and Washington gained a new urgency in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Qadhafi, who publicly denounced the attacks, found common cause with America—he too was highly concerned with fundamentalist Islamists, fermenting rebellion in his own state. Libyan intelligence officers approached U.S. officials with an offer to share intelligence and cooperate on counterterrorism efforts, further building trust between the two nations based on the need to deal with a common problem.

In March of 2003 the British government informed Washington of an electrifying new development. The head of Libyan intelligence, Musa Kusa, had approached British MI6 with an offer from Qadhafi to give up their WMD programs and long-range ballistic missiles in exchange for a normalization of relations.⁴⁸ In October, a merchant ship, the *BBC China*, was interdicted under the new Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in the Italian port of Taranto with centrifuge parts bound for Libya. Remarkably, the seizure of the nuclear enrichment components coincided with inspections of nuclear and chemical facilities in Libya by U.S. and British officials. During the negotiations leading up to the acceptance of inspections, American officials left the Libyans in no doubt about the depth and breadth of U.S. intelligence's knowledge of Libya's WMD programs. In the words of CIA Director George Tenet:

The leverage was intelligence. Our picture of Libya's WMD programs allowed CIA officers...to press the Libyans on the right questions, to expose inconsistencies, and to convince them that holding back was counterproductive.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Calabrese.

⁴⁸Gertz.

⁴⁹ George Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in Changing Global Context," testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 March 2004.

The revelations of the strength of U.S. knowledge about Libyan weapons programs and the interdiction of the uranium processing equipment on *BBC China* were important elements in Tripoli's decision to completely abandon WMD. Subsequently, Qadhafi broadcast on state television a decision to give up all nuclear and chemical weapons, prompting President Bush to issue an executive order in September 2004 ending most U.S. sanctions against Libya.⁵⁰ Years of sanctions, conditional engagement, conditional incentives, and mutual interests led Libya back into the fold of nations.

Until 2006, Libya still remained officially on the United States government's list of states that sponsor terrorism—the State Department's assessment of 2005 reported “outstanding questions over residual contacts with past terrorist clients,” and Libyan implication in plots to destabilize Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and Libya officially announced the resolution of any disputes in September of 2005.⁵¹ On 15 May 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that Libya was to be officially removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and that normal diplomatic relations with Tripoli would be resumed, citing, “historic decisions taken by Libya's leadership in 2003 to renounce terrorism and to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.”⁵² American oil companies are now working with Libya to upgrade its aging oil processing infrastructure, a United States liaison office has been opened in Tripoli, and President Bush has issued two waivers of the Arms Export Control Act allowing American companies to compete for contracts to destroy Libyan chemical weapons and refurbish military transport aircraft.⁵³

Having provided a historical sketch of United States-Libya relations over the last half-century, an analysis of the successful dissuasion of Libya's WMD programs is provided below.

⁵⁰ Blanchard, 5.

⁵¹ U.S. Department of State, “Libya,” *Country Reports on Terrorism 2004* (April 2005).

⁵² Eban Kaplan, “How Libya Got Off the List,” *Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder* (8 June 2006), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/10855/how_libya_got_off_the_list.html (accessed Jun 2006).

⁵³ Blanchard, 6.

C. ANALYSIS: DISSUASION AND LIBYA

The turning away of Libya from state-sponsored terrorism and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction provides perhaps the best examples of the successful application of dissuasion in U.S. diplomatic history. It demonstrates that state behavior can be changed, and the drive to acquire WMD capabilities can be stopped. But why, exactly, did Libya change course? The United States used coercion, economic and political sanctions, public exposure of Libyan WMD programs, and active interdiction of production equipment, all of which played a role.⁵⁴

An alternative explanation may be found in a form of “extended coercion:” United States Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith proclaimed that the lesson of U.S. military power projection in Afghanistan and Iraq caused Libya’s change of heart.⁵⁵ While the display of American power and resolve no doubt was sobering to Colonel Qadhafi, this explanation ignores the continued resistance of Iran and North Korea when confronted with the same lesson in American power, and years of Libyan resistance to U.S. *active* coercion.

Christopher Boucek, editor of the *Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor* in London, believes Tripoli was continuing to move ahead with its long-standing desire to reenter the community of nations:

For Libya, positive relations with the United States not only equate to much needed American financial and technological investment; almost as importantly they translate into the imprimatur of acceptance into the international community after years in the diplomatic wilderness. Most significantly, an end to the U.S. sanctions would allow Libya to seek badly needed access to international financial organizations.⁵⁶

Long-term American and, just as importantly, international sanctions certainly played a role in dissuading Libya. Sanctions and interdiction efforts significantly

⁵⁴ Joseph McFall, “From Rogue to Vogue: Why Did Libya Give Up Its Weapons of Mass Destruction?” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. Available from, <http://www.ccc.nps.mil/research/theses/mcfall05.pdf> (accessed May 2006). McFall provides a detailed analysis of the public and defense literature debate on the effect of various strategies employed against Libya.

⁵⁵ Gertz.

⁵⁶ Boucek.

complicated Libyan efforts to acquire WMD production equipment and know-how, and there is no doubt that economic sanctions put tremendous strain on the Libyan economy. But these pressures alone—even when coupled with punitive military strikes—did not have the desired effect until it became clear that the benefits of avoiding American enmity outweighed the costs of continuing on course. The accommodation offered by the Clinton administration in the late 1990s—a classic “carrot and sticks” strategy—gave the initial impetus to seek a return to the fold. Sanctions and punitive measures can set the stage for successful dissuasion, but, as can be seen in the Libyan case, engagement and incentives geared to expectations for a change of behavior were also required. Attention must also be paid to timing—economic sanctions needed years to put adequate pressure on Libya’s government, and the early revolutionary strategic culture had to mellow before any change of course could be contemplated.

Perhaps most importantly, the United States was only seeking a change in behavior and an abandonment of WMD development, not regime change. United States Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton’s rhetorical expansion of the “Axis of Evil” to include Libya—with its underlying theme of regime change—brought negotiations with Libya to a halt. Alexander Montgomery has described the effect regime change rhetoric had on Libya:

This uncompromising rhetoric [of regime change] limits U.S. policy options and places the United States in a difficult negotiating position. The United States and the United Kingdom could not reach an agreement with Libya until the Bush administration complied with a request by high-level British officials to remove Bolton from the U.S. negotiation team; Bolton’s unwillingness to compromise was preventing Libya from accepting a deal.⁵⁷

Clearly, words matter, and they especially matter if the words call for regime change.

Neither coercion nor unilateral sanctions alone were sufficient to modify the behavior of Libya. Ultimately, the full application of U.S. power combined with robust international support—targeted at limited and achievable policy goals—enabled by the

⁵⁷ Alexander Montgomery. “Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network,” *International Security*, Vol. 30 (Fall 2005): 153-73.

trust built through engagement, met with success in dissuading Libya from pursuit of WMD and support for international terrorism. These lessons are illustrated further below.

D. LESSONS

The key question raised by this case study is how did dissuasion achieve U.S. goals in the Libyan case? What lessons can be applied to other situations faced by the United States, and which lessons are unique to the Libyan case?

1. Coercion Alone May Not Work to Achieve Policy Goals

A coercion strategy that does not integrate other strategies will rarely achieve policy goals. The coercive air raids on Libya in 1986 and aggressive operations by the United States Navy in the Gulf of Sidra had little direct effect on the acquisition activities and behavior of Libya. Indeed, Libyan terrorist attacks abroad increased in their severity, and the air raids may have accelerated Libyan plans to procure WMD as a means of countering the overwhelming conventional military superiority of the West. The rapid destruction of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the removal of Sadaam Hussain from power in Iraq may have served as a sort of “extended coercion” lesson to leaders such as Qadhafi, as some American officials claim, but the continued intransigence of Iran and North Korea demonstrate the limited nature of that effect. More than just fear of U.S. military action is required to change behavior.

2. Engagement is Required to Build Trust on Both Sides

Engagement provides a vehicle for accommodation by building some measure of trust among contending parties. The breakthrough that resulted in Libya abandoning its WMD development programs and sponsorship of terrorism was based on the trust built up on both sides over the last decade. The Clinton administration’s acceptance of Libyan pleas to move the Pan Am bombing trial to neutral ground, in exchange for the extradition of the suspects, set the stage for the incremental trust building that followed. British sponsorship of lifting international sanctions in the UN built trust to the point where Libya felt bold enough to approach the British with an offer to abandon WMD

programs in exchange for the removal of the remaining U.S. sanctions—a move the United States agreed to, based on the trust engendered from intelligence help it had received from Libya following the 9/11 attacks. Collectively, this trust building engagement ultimately cleared the way for full reintegration of Libya into the international community as a responsible nation.

3. A Combination of Carrots and Sticks Seems to Motivate Good Behavior Best

Tangible incentives and penalties, as a package, provide the best incentive for moving state behavior in the desired direction. The long-term strategy employed against Libya—which included robust sanctions, interdiction of weapons materials, and coercive strikes—ultimately only proved successful when additional positive incentives were offered. Granted, the virtual quarantine that the international community imposed on Libya set the stage by depressing Libya’s economy and dimming her future prospects, but resolution only came when the prospect of a return to the international fold, with its attendant economic advantages, was offered as part of the deal for the Pan Am Flight 103 bombers. The United States offered no direct positive incentives such as financial aid, only an agreement to cease active opposition, which would have its own rewards. States, like humans, are often best motivated by the prospect of reward as well as punishment.

4. Harsh Rhetoric, Especially if It Involves Demands for Regime Change, Limits Options for Both Parties

Public and diplomatic rhetoric counts. Public threats and uncompromising statements are frequently meant for domestic consumption, but policy makers should be aware of their often negative effect on achieving strategic goals. An obvious difference between the rhetoric directed at Libya, and that showered on Iraq and North Korea, is the insistence on regime change in the latter two cases. When Undersecretary John Bolton lumped Libya in with the “Axis of Evil” it virtually halted any progress on discussions between Libya and U.S.-U.K negotiators. A regime confronted with the specter of forcible removal will be driven to almost any lengths to survive, whereas a state that can be sure of continuance will feel far freer to negotiate at the margins for mutual advantage.

5. Common Problems Can Lead to Ultimate Solutions

Addressing collective or bi-lateral problems provides an opportunity for engagement and trust building. Qadhafi's fear of an Islamic uprising in Libya dovetailed nicely with the United States Global War on Terrorism. In many ways, the United States and Libya share the same enemies and interests. The post 9/11 environment led to recognition of this by both Libyan and American intelligence, prompting a sharing of information on Islamic terrorist activities, eventually pointing the way towards a compromise that would be beneficial to both nations: the renouncement of Libya's WMD programs and her reintegration into the international community. Policy makers would be well advised to search for common ground with opponents—perhaps based on common problems—to begin a useful dialog.

6. Sanctions Require International Support to be Effective

Unilateral sanctions will rarely work to modify behavior when the target can bypass the sanctions, going elsewhere to meet domestic needs. The near complete diplomatic and economic isolation of Libya had perhaps the greatest effect on her behavior. In contrast, unilateral sanctions, such as those imposed by the United States on Cuba for many decades, have a history of very limited success. In order to dissuade capabilities building and poor behavior, sanctions must universally applied and rigorously enforced.

7. Intransigent States with Great Power Sponsors May Feel Themselves Immune to Pressure

States that have support from one great power will likely defy pressure from another great power. Empirically, Libya's behavior began to change in the 1990's when it lost her great power sponsor in the Soviet Union. This not only increased Libya's isolation, it removed the ultimate backstop for continued defiance. It will be difficult to successfully direct a dissuasion strategy at a state like North Korea, which has at least the tacit support of China, pointing to the need to sometimes direct dissuasion at second order targets, such as sponsoring or allied states.

8. Strategic Culture and Ideology in the Target State Matter

Strategies that attempt to move behavior outside of the range dictated by the target state's strategic culture will be unlikely to succeed. Strategic culture is notoriously difficult to assess, but the Libyan case demonstrates how the power of Qadhafi's ideology and the "Third Universal Theory" espoused in his *Green Book* narrowed the choices the Libyan leadership was willing to even contemplate. It can be surmised that the hold of ideology grew weaker as Qadhafi mellowed with age and the Third Universal Theory became obviously untenable, opening up more strategic options for Libya. Regardless of the specific case of Libya, it remains true that ideology and strategic culture powerfully limit the options available to governing elites, and thus limit the possible range of effective dissuasion strategies that can be successfully employed against a target state.

These are the lessons that can be drawn from the three decades of dissuasion strategies applied to the Libyan state, consistently and carefully applied over the course of four United States administrations.

E. CONCLUSION

The Libyan example demonstrates that a long-term strategy of dissuasion can indeed change the course of state behavior, and can indeed dissuade state officials from attempting to build weapons of mass destruction. Each situation is unique, however, and universal lessons concerning the application of dissuasion should be applied carefully: North Korea, for example, has a great power sponsor in China, which fundamentally changes the dynamic of a dissuasion policy of isolation. Still, the Libyan case suggests that dissuasion can generate positive results, especially if it can be applied with persistence and patience.

Simple negative "sticks" must be accompanied by appropriate "carrots" for the strategy to be truly effective. U.S. and international economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, punitive strikes, and interdiction all played prominent rolls in this story, but so too did a carefully crafted re-engagement strategy that avoided rhetorical insistence on regime change.

The example of Libya provides a template for dissuasion strategies against “rogue” states: internationally legitimate sanctions with rigorous enforcement, interdiction of weapons components, clear understanding of the limits imposed by strategic culture, and conditional engagement can modify behavior and capabilities-building over the long-term.

IV. DISSUADING BEHAVIOR CASE STUDY: BRITISH OPERATIONS IN THE BALTIC, 1918–1921

A. INTRODUCTION

In the years immediately following the Great War, Britain midwifed the birth of the Baltic States, using coercion, deterrence, and dissuasion strategies to fend off German and Soviet intrusions, and to keep White Russian armies at bay. Britain's strategic goals were to establish a buffer between Germany and Russia, prevent the spread of communism into Central Europe, support White Russian forces in the Russian civil war, and to open up Baltic markets to British goods. Dissuasion strategies played a key role in British Baltic operations during this period.

In late 1918, in the closing months of the First World War, the Russian Baltic Provinces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania moved toward independence, grasping at an opportunity brought about by the abdication of Czar Nicholas and the defeat of the Russian Army. When the Armistice ending the Great War went into effect on 11 November 1918, victorious Great Britain faced a changed world. Its relative power in the world had declined considerably, its economy was poorly situated to compete in world markets, and the nation was under severe financial strain brought on by four years of all-out war effort. Britain also found itself with an enormous navy honed to razor sharp efficiency by four years of conflict—an over-abundance of military capacity looking for a mission. Britain wished to restore the balance of power to Europe—fearing an alliance between Germany and Russia—and sensed that the Baltic States and Poland might serve as buffers to keep the two separated. All Allied politicians also feared the spread of Bolshevism from Russia to Central and Western Europe, a disease seemingly ripe for incubation in their own disillusioned populations. Britain also wished to open up any available economic markets to British goods, with a view to repaying its enormous war debt and regaining her preeminent position.

With these goals in mind, the British government sent a squadron of light cruisers and destroyers to the Baltic in the winter of 1918, charged with continuing the blockade of Germany and establishing relations with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Over the next two years the naval force in the Baltic helped beat back the Bolshevik armies, prevented

the takeover of the Baltic provinces by German and White Russian armies, reestablished trade, and generally nursed the new Baltic States to life. These feats were accomplished without landing any major ground forces—Royal Navy units under the command of Admirals Sinclair and Cowan were the instruments of choice. The Navy and the British Foreign Office deftly used a combination dissuasion, deterrence, and coercion to meet national goals, effectively employing economic, political, and military instruments of power amidst a highly fluid and confusing environment.

This chapter examines the two years of British involvement in the Baltic that began at the close of World War I. The use of dissuasion and persuasion techniques are highlighted throughout the narrative. Following a discussion of the historical events, an analysis is offered, and lessons learned from the British Baltic episode will also be presented.

B. BACKGROUND: THE BRITISH IN THE BALTIC

The British squadron ordered into the Baltic faced an incredibly confused and complex geo-political and military situation. The shaky states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were beset on all sides by enemies and internal strife. The situation was, in the words of James Cable, “pregnant with formless menace [and] offering obscure opportunities.”⁵⁸ At the close of World War I, the British simply wished to begin dealing with the myriad problems presented in the Baltic. Later, policy shifted to the primary goal of defending the sovereignty of the new Baltic States, often using dissuasion as the tool of choice.

1. The Close of the Great War

The cruise journal of HMS *Delhi* gives an idea of the chaotic conditions that existed in the Baltic in 1918: “Now the days following the Great Peace were troublous days. There were wars and rumors of wars, famines and pestilences... Of all lands, no land was more distressed than the Land of Rus.”⁵⁹ In March of 1918, the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty negotiations between Germany and the Bolshevik government of Russia had

⁵⁸ James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 46.

⁵⁹ Geoffrey Bennett, *Cowan’s War* (London: Collins Press, 1964), 11.

been greatly complicated by moves towards independence in the former Russian provinces of the Baltic. Leon Trotsky resisted the German demands for the Baltic provinces to be allowed to secede, but a renewed German offensive in the east forced him to accept the German terms. The allies, fearing the weight of newly released Eastern Front troops in the West, sent troops and ships to Murmansk in an effort to tie up German forces and prevent large amounts of allied war-stocks from falling into German hands, thus beginning British involvement in Russian and Baltic affairs.⁶⁰

German armies continued to occupy Lithuania and Latvia at the close of the war. In February, Germany allowed Lithuania to proclaim independence on condition it sign a treaty of perpetual alliance. Latvia and Estonia were to be controlled by a puppet *Landesrat* set up in Riga. In Estonia, the ethnic Germans appealed to Berlin to drive out local Communists, who promptly fled to Russia. Estonia declared its independence, remaining free for 24 hours until the German 8th Army occupied Riga on 25 February 1918.

Following the Armistice on 11 November, the situation in the Baltic grew even more confused. Article XII of the Armistice specified "...the Germans were to withdraw from the territory that was formerly part of the Russian Empire as soon as the Allies should consider the moment suitable, having regard to interior conditions of those territories." This clause was designed to ensure the German Army prevented the spread of Bolshevism to the west. In Estonia, however, the German Army mutinied, demanding to be immediately sent home. Estonia at once declared independence a second time, on 11 November 1918. The Latvian and Estonian envoys in London anxiously made clear how precarious their position was—Bolshevik forces were threatening to intervene as soon as the German Army withdrew. The first British response was formulated by Foreign Secretary Balfour:

One result has been to modify the principle motive which prompted our expeditions to Murmansk, Archangel and Vladivostok. So long as a life and death struggle was proceeding on the Western Front it was of the first importance to prevent the withdrawal of German forces from Russia to France; but with the conclusion of the German Armistice this motive has

⁶⁰ Bennett, 23-4.

no further force. For what then are we maintaining troops in various parts of what was once the Russian Empire? It seems commonly supposed that those expeditions are partial and imperfect efforts to carry out a campaign against Bolshevism... This view indicates a complete misapprehension of what His Majesty's Government is able, or desires to do...But it does not follow that we can disinterest ourselves wholly from Russian affairs... [N]ew anti-Bolshevist administrations have grown up under the shadow of Allied forces. We are responsible for their existence and must endeavor to assist them. For us no alternative is open at the present than to use such troops as we possess to the best advantage; where there are no troops, to supply arms and money; and in the case of the Baltic provinces, to protect, as far as we can, the nascent nationalities with our fleet.⁶¹

Balfour's formulation clearly included elements of dissuasion in the overall strategy: The fleet would be used for support and coercion, and economic means would be used to influence the behavior of all players in the region.

There was very limited tolerance for foreign interventions with troops in war-weary Britain, and none for ground adventures in the Baltic region. Nevertheless, the guns on the Western Front had no sooner fallen silent when the British Foreign Office asked the Admiralty to immediately send ships to the Baltic to enforce the continuing blockade of Germany and to establish relations with the Baltic countries. Throughout the British involvement in the Baltic, the Foreign Office, the Royal Navy, and Military missions on the ground worked closely together to meet national goals, in the long-standing pattern of Britain's involvement in Empire. On 21 November, a squadron of light cruisers, destroyers, and minesweepers was ordered to the Baltic under Rear-Admiral Sinclair, who flew his flag on HMS *Cardiff*. Sinclair was to proceed to the port of Libau in Latvia and then on to Reval in Estonia. He was ordered to show the British flag and support British policy as circumstances dictated. On the subject of supporting the Baltic State governments, he was charged with supplying arms to the Estonians and Latvians, but also to make clear that no troops would be forthcoming.⁶² Admiral Sinclair's squadron found itself menaced by tens of thousands of mines and plunged into a chaotic situation involving multiple civil wars and revolutions. Britain was not at war

⁶¹ Bennett, 30.

⁶² Ibid., 34.

with Soviet Russia, but Admiralty instructions specified that "...a Bolshevik man-of-war operating off the coast of the Baltic Provinces must be assumed to be doing so with hostile intent, and should be treated accordingly."⁶³ During a refueling stop in Denmark, the British Ambassador relayed an urgent message to Admiral Sinclair from the Estonian leader, Constantine Pats, urging the Allied fleet to hasten to Reval before it fell to invading Soviet forces. Sinclair sortied the next day, despite the unavailability of minesweepers.⁶⁴

Upon arrival in Reval, Sinclair was immediately forced to make a variety of decisions that involved coercion and dissuasion/persuasion. The Red Army was now only forty miles outside the capital, and a frantic Prime Minister Pats requested a British Army battalion and a fleet to defend the capital, and even sought to make Estonia a British protectorate. Meanwhile, the White Russian Army of the North-West, retreating from Pskov, sought money and a British liaison. Sinclair refused this last request, suspicious of the White army's intentions in Estonia. To Pats he promised conditional support of arms and training, if the Estonian National Council ceased its squabbling and showed a united front.⁶⁵ The following day Sinclair elected to expand on his limited orders by conducting a bombardment of the Red Army rear areas, effectively halting the Bolshevik offensive by destroying the bridges over which Red supply columns flowed. During several naval skirmishes over the next few days, two Bolshevik destroyers were captured when they attempted a counter-bombardment. Cowan subsequently turned these ships over to the nascent Estonian Navy, notwithstanding the objections of the White Russians.⁶⁶

On 19 December, Sinclair sent several units to the Latvian port of Riga under the command of Captain H.H. Smyth. Smyth found conditions in Latvia were even worse than in Estonia. The German Army was preparing to withdraw and leave its arms and

⁶³ Bennett, 34.

⁶⁴ The British "Town" class minesweepers were coal-fired. Their coal-collier had been sunk en-route by a mine in the North Sea, forcing the minesweepers to stay behind in Copenhagen. In the event, the cruiser HMS *Cassandra* was sunk by a mine the next night during the passage east through the Baltic.

⁶⁵ Bennett, 36-9.

⁶⁶ The Bolshevik Fleet Commander, Admiral Raskolnikov, was captured on *Spartak*. He was found hidden under twelve bags of potatoes. In June 1919, he was exchanged for 18 British prisoners.

supplies to the oncoming Bolsheviks. Smyth immediately pressed the German High Command to meet its Article XII treaty obligations. When the Red advance continued without visible opposition by the Germans, Smyth made it forcefully clear that the Allies viewed the general Armistice peace as in jeopardy. This had little effect on the Germans, who secretly planned to force the desperate Latvian government to seek help on German terms—terms which included colonization by demobilized German soldiers.⁶⁷ Meanwhile, the British had landed arms for the Latvian government forces, suppressed a Bolshevik inspired mutiny of two Latvian regiments by means of naval bombardment, and begun gathering British subjects and dignitaries in preparation for evacuation. Smyth communicated his increasingly precarious position to Sinclair and the Admiralty, requesting further assistance. In London, however, conditions had once again changed. On December 30th, President Woodrow Wilson declared that America would not become further involved in Russian affairs, and would seek to become disentangled entirely. The following day, Prime Minister Lloyd George ordered Sinclair's squadron to withdraw from the Baltic, over the objections of the Admiralty.⁶⁸ Sinclair informed the Latvian government that he would not be able to provide any further assistance.

On 6 January, Sinclair sailed for Copenhagen and home. While on passage, conditions changed once again. The announcement of Britain's intention to withdraw prompted the new German commander in the Baltic, General Count von Goltz, to seize the opportunity offered and establish an armed camp to promote German interests. This alarming development in turn led to the Admiralty sending another squadron of ships to the Baltic under Rear Admiral Sir Walter Cowan, who met Sinclair in Copenhagen. The Admiralty's orders to Cowan were to prevent raids on Baltic coastal towns, thwart interference with civil relief operations, and to prevent the spread of Bolshevism.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Edgar Anderson, "An Undeclared Naval War. The British-Soviet Naval Struggle in the Baltic, 1918-1920," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. 12 (July, 1962): 47.

⁶⁸ William Fletcher, "The British Navy in the Baltic 1918-1920," *Journal of Baltic Studies*, Vol. 7 (1976): 139.

⁶⁹ Anderson, 52.

2. Britain Begins Dissuasion Operations in the Baltic

Before sailing for the Baltic, Admiral Cowan summarized the situation thus: “It seemed to me that there never was such a tangle... An unbeaten German army, two kinds of belligerent Russians, Letts, Finns, Estonians, Lithuanians, ice, mines—60,000 of them! Russian submarines, German small craft, Russian battleships, cruisers and destroyers all only waiting for the ice to melt to ravage the Baltic.”⁷⁰ Cowan’s misgivings, however, could be partly allayed by the overwhelming maritime force the British would deploy to the Baltic—the superiority of the Royal Navy would allow Cowan to readily take advantage of opportunities as they emerged.

The confused situation in the Baltic was reflected in London, where various factions within the war cabinet pushed their own agendas. Admiral Wemyss, the First Sea Lord, lamented the divisions within the British Government:

The situation as regards the operations now being carried out by the Navy in the Baltic Provinces is one that calls for consideration with a view to determining our future policy... Demands for assistance of all kinds are being made... The time has come for a decision as to our future policy. We have already lost one new and efficient light cruiser and 11 lives. The existence of the Bolshevik Navy...cannot be ignored.⁷¹

Over the next few months, however, British policy began to coalesce around the notion that Britain’s primary aim should be the viable and continued independence of the Baltic States. E.H. Carr, Foreign Office Third Secretary, summarized,

It is most undesirable that General Yudenitch (Commander of the White Russian North-West Army) should be in any way encouraged to interfere in Finland or Estonia or to make either of these countries a base for offensive operations...[the] result would probably be the sweeping of Estonia, and possibly Finland, by Bolshovism.⁷²

Britain wished to support White Russian efforts to defeat Bolshevism, but not at the expense of the independence of the Baltic States, and would use dissuasion to keep the Russians out of the Baltic. In point of fact, Britain was coming to the realization that it would likely be forced to coexist with the government of Bolshevik Russia in the

⁷⁰ Bennett, 70.

⁷¹ Ibid., 51.

⁷² Cable, 49.

future, and accordingly instructed the chief of the military mission, General Hubert Gough, to concentrate on establishing British influence in the Baltic and not to imperil relations with the likely future government of Russia.⁷³ In May Georges Clemenceau affirmed Allied Power willingness to assist the White Russians, but only on condition “...that there be regulation of mutual relations with the newly formed boarder states with the concurrence of the League of Nations, pending which, their autonomy was recognized.”⁷⁴

On 9 February 1919, Admiral Cowan sent a ship to supply the Latvian Army with arms and ammunition, which failed to prevent the overthrow of the Latvian government by a German-backed puppet regime in April. The situation was also deteriorating in Estonia, where a Red offensive was pushing back the Estonian and Russian White Armies. Leaving Latvia for the moment, Cowan sent most of his ships to support the Estonian Army’s left flank. Of great concern to Cowan, two powerful Bolshevik battleships lay at the Russian port of Kronstadt. The rapid movement of ships that engaged in a wide variety of missions during this period demonstrates how well suited naval forces can be to dissuasion missions, with their inherent mobility and flexibility.

On 25 April, Hungarian Communists offered to mediate a settlement between the Bolsheviks and the Estonians, but Cowan threatened withdrawal of support to the Estonians unless they rejected the Hungarian offer.⁷⁵ Over the next few months, commanders developed relationships with local leaders and a detailed awareness of local conditions, as Royal Navy units supported the Estonian and White counter-offensive with bombardment and amphibious operations, fought several inconclusive battles with Red naval forces, and supplied arms and ammunition to Estonian and White forces. In June, Cowan decided to resolve the situation with the Red fleet once and for all. On 18

⁷³ John Hiden, “From Peace to War: Britain, Germany and the Baltic Sates 1918-1921,” *Journal of Baltic Studies*, Vol. 19 (1988): 374.

⁷⁴ Stanley Page, *The Formation of the Baltic States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 149.

⁷⁵ Fletcher, 140.

August, a coordinated attack by British aircraft and fast motor torpedo boats on Kronstadt resulted in the sinking of two battleships, a destroyer, and a depot repair ship.⁷⁶

Meanwhile, Latvia's situation had gone from bad to worse. Riga fell to the German Army under General Goltz, confining the Latvian government to a single Latvian destroyer moored in the harbor. Goltz formed an alliance with a Russian expatriate, Pawel Bermondt, who commanded an army of White Russians. Bermondt attacked, scattering Latvian army units and treating Latvian civilians with such severity that it prompted the Allies to re-impose the blockade on Germany's Baltic coast on 10 October, demanding an immediate withdrawal of the German Army in Latvia. Cowan and the other Allied naval commanders clamped down a total blockade on the German coast, preventing all shipping from entering German waters, even sealing German fishing craft in-port. Without orders, Cowan and the other Allied commanders in the Baltic amplified the withdrawal demand, requiring the removal of all German soldiers from west of the Daugava river by noon on 15 October. When these demands were not met, British and French warships began to shell German positions. By 11 November, the majority of the German Army, dogged by shelling from Allied warships, withdrew into East Prussia. Suffering under the effects of the naval blockade, the German government withdrew all German troops from Latvian soil by 30 October. The immediate strategy of coercion used here supported the long term strategy of dissuading the Germans from interfering in Baltic State affairs.

Also in October, the White Russian Army began its final offensive toward Petrograd. The Estonians feared a White Russian victory as much as a Bolshevik one, and were reluctant to provide support to General Yudenitch, given that the White slogan was "Russia, One and Indivisible."⁷⁷ The British, striving to entice the Estonians and Russians toward the twin British goals of Baltic independence and the defeat of Bolshevism, once again threatened to cut off aid. They demanded that the Russians sign an agreement with the Estonians granting independence, and insisted that the Estonians

⁷⁶ The first Sea Lord sent a congratulatory message to Cowan, but the government saw this development with consternation, while still debating what course of action to take toward Russia. See Anderson, 66.

⁷⁷ Page, 176.

provide support for the upcoming offensive. Both parties reluctantly acquiesced.⁷⁸ In the event, the offensive failed—despite support from Royal Navy and Estonian Army units—and the White Army was driven back into Estonia. The Estonians, fearing the loss of their hard won independence, disarmed the retreating Russians with British consent.

Separately, each Baltic State began negotiations with Bolshevik Russia for peace, which the Allies half-heartedly opposed. The British withdrew the majority of their fleet in the Baltic on 26 December, and the Estonian's signed an armistice with Russia on the last day of 1919. The Treaty of Tartu between Russia and Estonia was signed on 2 February 1920, in which Russia agreed to recognize the independence of Estonia and renounce all rights to sovereignty over Estonian territory and her people.⁷⁹

The British left behind military advisory missions with each of the Baltic States, and a small naval squadron: in the ongoing competition for political sway and economic position Britain recognized the importance of military-to-military contact in influencing the future direction of the Baltic nations, especially since they would be dependent on outside suppliers for their arms.⁸⁰

Summarizing British involvement in the Baltic, the Estonian Commander-in-Chief, General Laidoner, said that if the British fleet had not come in December 1918, "...we should have fallen into the whirlpool of Bolshevism, and the fate of the other Baltic Countries would have been the same."⁸¹

C. ANALYSIS: DISSUASION IN THE BALTIC

After almost two years of hard sailing, the British fleet returned home. With some minor exceptions, the British had avoided the commitment of ground troops in the Baltic, instead using its ready supply of naval power, limited military missions on the ground, and advisors from the Foreign Office to influence events. While the goal of returning Russia to its pre- Bolshevik state failed, other British goals in the Baltic were

⁷⁸ Page., 177.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 181.

⁸⁰ Donald Stoker, *Britain, France and the Naval Arms Trade in the Baltic* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 45.

⁸¹ Fletcher, 142.

largely achieved: The spread of Bolshevism had been halted at the Russian border, buffer states were established between Germany and Russia, German forces had been removed from the area, and considerable British economic and political influence in the Baltic had been achieved. Through careful application of dissuasion, deterrence, and coercion Cowan and a few other British officers positively influenced events in the Baltic to meet British ambitions.

British dissuasion activity was aimed primarily at White Russian forces and the Baltic States. The main tools used by Britain were conditional support (financial, military, and moral), and threatened withdrawal of support. Three key episodes illustrate the efficacy of dissuasion: the prevention of White Russian intrusion into the Baltic States, the suppression of Hungarian communist influence in Estonia, and forcing the White Russian and Estonian armies to work together in the 1919 Fall Offensive. British forces also used offensive and defensive military action, such as the destruction of the Red Fleet, to establish the security environment in which the Baltic States could achieve independence.

In the larger theater, deterrence and coercion were used regularly. British forces directly attacked interfering German forces, and imposed a crippling blockade on the German coast in order to force German compliance with treaty provisions and to eject German influence from the Baltic States. These strategies existed alongside dissuasion, but were also key components of the overall dissuasive goal of preventing interference with the newly established Baltic States.

Naval forces proved particularly effective at advancing British interests in the Baltic. The Royal Navy seemed to be everywhere in the Baltic, as Cowan moved his forces around rapidly to take advantage of shifting conditions, cooperating closely with allies, military missions on the ground, and Foreign Office agents. The stable commitment of forces, with only two commanders over two years, increased RN effectiveness, as Cowan and his officers developed a detailed feel for the shifting conditions throughout the Baltic. The adaptability and strategic mobility of naval forces proved key to British successes in the Baltic.

D. LESSONS FROM THE BALTIC

Several lessons can be extracted from British Baltic operations between December 1918 and December 1919.

1. Close Cooperation between All Instruments of Power is Required for Effective Policy Implementation

Royal Navy, military missions on the ground, and Foreign Office officials cooperated closely to meet policy goals in the Baltic. Although the relationship between the British Foreign Office and the Admiralty was not perfect, the Foreign Office did see the Royal Navy as a legitimate instrument of policy to be used to further national goals. Drawing on their long colonial experience, the British recognized that force and politics are intertwined and mutually supportive. All too often, the United States State Department and the Pentagon see their missions as mutually exclusive and competitive, believing one takes over where the other leaves off, separated by the artificial barrier of war. The military must be willing to advance national goals, even if it requires unconventional “non-warfighting” operations, while the State Department (and other state entities) must be willing to trust the military to judiciously exert influence overseas where appropriate.

2. Operations Such as Those in the Baltic Require a Ready Military Capacity that Can be Employed without Excessive Strain on the Force

A military heavily committed to its limits will be unable to easily support national goals at short notice. The British found themselves with an excess capacity in 1919 as a result of the war buildup. The British were only able to undertake the military component of its Baltic strategy because of the ready availability of highly trained forces available for immediate deployment; the reserve capacity to take advantage of situations “pregnant with formless menace, offering obscure opportunities” must be maintained.

3. Navies are Well Suited to Operations that Veer Rapidly between Dissuasion, Deterrence, and Coercion

Unlike ground forces, a navy can be rapidly moved to trouble spots from over the horizon, then withdrawn or inserted as the situation dictates. Cowan’s units in the Baltic

frequently found themselves rapidly moving from supplying Baltic State forces, to deterring German armies, then on to attacking Bolshevik forces. The inherent operational mobility and flexibility of naval forces gives them a unique ability to exert the right type of influence at the right place and time.

4. The Relative Power of Real and Potential Adversaries is of Primary Consideration in the Decision to Undertake Operations Like Those of the British in the Baltic

Dissuasion often requires a superior correlation of forces; coercion *always* requires it. In the Baltic, the overriding preponderance of Allied power allowed operations against the Germans and Bolsheviks that would not have been possible had a more balanced correlation of forces existed. Contrast, for example, the situation in the Baltic following the disintegration of the German and Russian empires to the circumstances subsequent to the break-up of the Soviet Union. In the words of James Cable, “In 1991 it would have been inadvisable for a U.S. squadron to cruise off the coasts of the Soviet Union in readiness to exploit turmoil ashore in the interest of U.S. policy.”⁸²

5. Continuous and Long-Term Presence Matters

Complex operations require a detailed knowledge of local conditions to be successful. The British kept a significant force on-station for over two years, with only a single command change, allowing the Commander to develop a feel for important subtleties in a fluid situation. The highly confused situation in the Baltic mirrors many regions around the world today. Politicians and Commanders must be willing to commit forces for long periods of time with a stable leadership turnover. Local commanders need time to develop knowledge of complex situations on the ground in order to apply the instruments of power judiciously and effectively.

⁸² Cable, 46.

6. Military-to-Military Contact Can Exert an Important Influence

Military-to-military contact provides multiple avenues to exert influence, through personal relationships, access to various levels of government in the target state, and the economic influence offered by arms trade. British officers advised and trained the militaries of the Baltic States, creating a reservoir of goodwill and influencing policy in positive directions. The establishment of permanent military missions continued this influence. Arms trade (or outright grants of military equipment) can also establish well-worn paths for foreign militaries to purchase arms, creating influence through “sunk cost” thinking and repair parts deals.

7. The Mind-Set and “Strategic Culture” the Target Plays a Most Important Role in Choosing How and When to Apply Dissuasion/Persuasion or Coercion policies

Strategic culture works to limit the acceptable options open to the target of dissuasion. A clear understanding of the target’s strategic culture is required if a dissuasion is to be successful. The British liberally used dissuasion and persuasion on the Estonians and White Russians, for instance, by holding out offers of support (supplies, arms, money, training, and naval fire support) or threatening to withhold support. These tactics clearly would not have worked on the Germans, forcing the British to adopt more aggressive competence measures.

8. Dissuasion Can Target Near-Term or Long-Term Behavior

The British used dissuasion strategies to meet both immediate and long-term goals. Dissuasive or persuasive methods forced the Estonians and White Russians to work together in the short-term for the October 1919 offensive, but were also used to draw the Baltic States into the long-term economic orbit of Britain, particularly with regard to naval arms trade. Of note, Britain’s long-term aim of keeping Estonia and the other Balkan States in the fight against Bolshevism worked in the short-term but ultimately failed. The target of dissuasion must conclude that the benefits of compliance outweigh the benefits of non-compliance—as soon as this balance shifts, dissuasion losses its capability to influence.

These are some of the salient points that can be teased out of the British experience in the Baltic following the Great War. Dissuasion may be hard to separate from the other elements of traditional gunboat diplomacy, but it does, in fact, have its own logic and can be operationalized in its own unique way. Dissuasion can complement other tactics to meet policy goals when intelligently applied by the full range of national power.

E. CONCLUSION

With the exception of returning Russia to her pre-revolutionary condition, Britain's intervention in the Baltic proved highly successful. At maximum effort, there were some 65 Royal Navy ships operating in the Baltic. Over the two-year span of Admiral Sinclair's and Admiral Cowan's command, nine ships were lost with 171 men. Against this cost, three countries achieved their independence, a threatening German army was forced to return to Prussian soil, Bolshevik forces were driven back into Russia, and viable trade returned to the Baltic. Dissuasion and persuasion strategies played a significant role in this list of successes as part of a larger strategy of classical gunboat diplomacy, shaping an entire region onto a path favorable to British interests.

The lessons of Britain's Baltic interlude, when properly applied, can help modern warriors and diplomats deal with the problems of the twenty first century. Much like the Baltic of 1919, there are areas of the world where weak states and strong states compete with sub-state actors for influence in arenas of constantly shifting circumstances—only now, in an era of rapid global transportation and weapons of mass-destruction, the stakes may be much higher.

The events detailed above bring home some valuable lessons: coordinate action by all instruments of national power; maintain sufficient military capacity to deal with unexpected crisis and opportunity; employ carefully calibrated military force, especially naval forces that can remain on station and be committed or withdrawn as the situation dictates; maintain long term on-station contact, especially military-to-military contact; and take into account the strategic culture and mind-set of those we seek to influence. Collectively, these lessons from the 1918-1921 experience of the British in the Baltic can help us navigate the storms of the twenty first century.

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V. FAILED DISSUASION CASE STUDY: THE BRITISH ATTEMPT TO DISSUADE GERMANY 1898–1913

A. INTRODUCTION

In the decade before the First World War, Britain failed to dissuade Germany from building a fleet that threatened the Royal Navy's control of the seas. The British used a variety of dissuasive techniques—including diplomatic engagement and building a navy of such size as to make effective competition impossible—but were ultimately defeated by fractional domestic politics and a German strategic culture resistant to alternative paths. Britain's concerted attempt at dissuasion provides valuable insight into the limitations of dissuasion.

At the end of the nineteenth century, it became apparent to many Britons that the overwhelming dominance of British sea power that had existed since Trafalgar in 1805 was no longer quite so overwhelming. The difficulties encountered in the Boer War prompted many Englishmen to survey the world anew, elevating Britain's waning naval dominance into the arena of public debate. The British government and the Royal Navy, watching the “new navalism” sweep the globe, realized that maintenance of a navy superior to any combination of other nations was becoming impossible. All around the world Royal Navy squadrons found themselves outclassed by local rivals: in the Caribbean, the new and powerful American navy, in the Far East the Japanese navy, and most of all in Europe, where the potential combination of French and Russian naval forces was greatly feared. The emergence of rail transportation also meant that the Royal Navy could no longer be assured of monopolizing the means of transporting arms and armies, a particular source of alarm when Russian rail lines extended to the border of Afghanistan, threatening India. British fleet policy was based on a “two power” standard for the Royal Navy, aimed primarily at a combination of the French and Russian fleets. As the nineteenth century turned to the twentieth, great efforts went into a complete realignment of the Navy: hundreds of older ships were discarded as “too weak to fight and too slow to run away,” in the words of First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher.⁸³ The fleet was

⁸³ Arthur Herman, *To Rule the Waves* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 480.

reorganized to bring the majority of combat power home to European waters, after outstanding diplomatic issues with the United States were settled and an alliance with Japan in the Far East was forged.

As the world experienced tectonic shifts in the geo-political situation that had existed since 1815, it also was undergoing profound technological upheavals. This turmoil had a tremendous impact on naval technology, which underwent a revolution from wooden sailing ships, to steel-armored battleships firing high-velocity explosive shells, in less than 40 years. These technological leaps raised the specter of the Royal Navy being made obsolete by a competitor's unforeseen innovation. Indeed, Britain's navy made its own vast fleet obsolete during this period several times by adopting various sea-going innovations.

Onto this rapidly changing world stage strode a powerful new Germany, riding a wave of population growth, new economic muscle, and nationalist sentiment. Restless Germans took note of Britain's century long Pax Britannia domination and concluded that sea power was the answer for Germany's own aspirations. Kaiser Wilhelm, Alfred von Tirpitz, and the new German navalists breathed in A.T Mahan's theories, concluding that a powerful German navy was the key to taking a rightful "place in the sun."⁸⁴ In 1898, the British faced down the French at Fashoda over a dispute over the Upper Nile, forcing the French into a humiliating retreat in the face of Britain's overwhelming naval might, prompting the Kaiser to say, "The poor French... They have not read their Mahan!"⁸⁵

Germany's naval buildup quickly alarmed Britain. Initial unease at the thought of a Continental alliance directed against Britain turned to angst aimed at Germany alone, as the extent of German naval expansion became apparent. The tension of naval matters became the single most important point of conflict between the two powers. In the period 1902–1913 Britain would pursue a vigorous policy of dissuasion directed at persuading Germany to abandon its plans for a battle fleet capable of wresting control of the seas from the Royal Navy. Using diplomatic engagement, erecting technological and

⁸⁴ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Penguin Books, 1976), 214.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 206.

financial barriers to competition, and forming an encircling alliance, the British government would try—and ultimately fail—to move Germany onto a path away from confrontation. This chapter will examine the British effort and why it failed. First, a historical study of Anglo-German relations in the period before the Great War will be presented, followed by an analysis of specific dissuasion strategies used. Finally, lessons learned from this episode will be presented. Table 1 provides a timeline of major events in the Anglo-German relationships in the period 1890–1914:

Table 1. Timeline - Decline in Anglo-German Relations, 1890–1914⁸⁶

1890	A.T. Mahan publishes <i>The Influence of Seapower On History, 1660-1783</i>
1890 18 March	Dismissal of Bismarck
1891 27 August	Franco-Russian Entente
1892 17 August	Franco-Russian Military Convention
1893 17 January	Franco-Russian Alliance signed
1895 June	Opening of Kiel canal in Germany
1896 3 January	Wilhelm II sends ‘Kruger Telegram’
1897	Tirpitz becomes Navy IG
1898 26 March	First German Naval Bill passes the Reichstag
1898 1 April	Chamberlin suggests an alliance with Germany
1899 12 October	Boer War begins
1900 14 June	Second Navy Bill, proposed by Tirpitz, passes Reichstag
1900 17 October	Bulow becomes Reich Chancellor
1901 20 January	Kaiser Wilhelm arrives in London to visit his dieing grandmother, Queen Victoria
1901 October-December	Anglo-German alliance talks, which ultimately collapse
1901 November	“ABC” article published in the <i>National Review</i> , raising the alarm on the new German navy.
1902 28 June	Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) renewed
1903 May	Edward VII visits Paris, beginning a thawing of relations between Britain and France that would eventually lead to alliance.
1904 4 February	Russo-Japanese War begins
1904 8 April	Entente Cordiale reached between Britain and France
1904 May	Fisher becomes First Sea Lord
1905 30 April	Anglo- French military talks begin
1905 27 May	Russian fleet destroyed by Japanese at Tsushima
1905 5 October	HMS <i>Dreadnought</i> keel laid
1906 5 June	Third German Navy Law passes
1907 1 January	Sir Eyre Crowe circulates memo on the sources of German behavior and advocating a counter-balancing alliance with France.
1907 15 June	Second Hague Peace Conference
1907 31 August	Anglo-Russian Entente
1908 14 June	Fourth German Navy Law passes
1909 9 February	HMS <i>Dreadnaught</i> launched
1909 12 March	British Navy bill passes for eight additional dreadnaughts following “Navy Scare”
1911 9 February	Churchill gives a widely reported speech aimed at Germany declaring the British navy a necessity and the German fleet a luxury
1911 21 July	Lloyd George warns Germany in his famous “Mansion House” speech.
1911 25 October	Churchill becomes First Lord of the Admiralty
1912 7 February	Kaiser announces new army and navy bills
1912 March	Churchill announces enlargement of Royal Navy and removal of Malta squadron to home waters. New German naval building program announced. Anglo-German naval arms limitation talks collapse.
1912 December	German Ambassador informed that England would aid France in the event of a German attack. Wilhelm II calls military conference in Potsdam in response.
1913 26 March	Churchill makes the first of several proposals for a naval building ‘holiday’
1914 28 June	Assassination of Franz Ferdinand
1914 28 July	Churchill orders fleet to wartime base at Scapa Flow
1914 3 August	Great War begins

⁸⁶ Table 1 is drawn from the Great War Timeline, <http://www.gwpda.org/wwi-www.willnick/timeline.htm>, (accessed May 2006).

B. BACKGROUND: THE RISE OF ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL RIVALRY

Anglo-German enmity emerged in a very short period at the turn of the nineteenth century. German attitudes toward Britain began to change when Kaiser Wilhelm II took the imperial throne, and with popular opposition to British actions in the Boer War. Britain's view of Germany began to seriously deteriorate when it became apparent that Germany intended to build a navy to challenge the Royal Navy's domination of the seas.

1. The Challenge from Germany Emerges

The rapid expansion of the German navy grew out of swift industrialization and population growth, which generated a concurrent interest in overseas trade and colonies. Once the Kaiser dismissed the great Chancellor Bismarck in 1890, German foreign policy became altogether more restless and aimed at the heart of British interests. The fall of Bismarck and his replacement as Chancellor by Prince Bernhard von Bulow in 1897, and the appointment of Alfred von Tirpitz as Secretary of State for the Navy, marked an abrupt shift in Anglo-German relations. In June 1897, at his first audience with the Kaiser, Tirpitz laid out his vision:

For Germany the most dangerous enemy at the present time is England. It is also the enemy against which we most urgently require a certain measure of naval force as a political power factor...our fleet must be so constructed that it can unfold its greatest military potential between Heligoland and the Thames... The military situation against England demands battleships in as great a number as possible.”⁸⁷

Wilhelm enthusiastically agreed:

[It must] threaten English coastal towns, while British sea power was busy in the Mediterranean against France or perhaps simultaneously against Russia in Far Eastern Waters – a circumstance whose possibility people in England could not fail to perceive... Only when we can hold out our mailed fist against his face, will the British lion draw back...⁸⁸

Both Wilhelm and Tirpitz made twin assumptions that Britain would be forced to keep the lion's share of the Royal Navy off tending the British Empire, and that the

⁸⁷ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (London: Ashfield Press, 1980), 224.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

British would not see and respond to changing strategic circumstances. These assumptions would prove to be catastrophic for Germany and Europe.

As the nineteenth century waned, Britain still feared her ancient enemy France above all others, prompting First Sea Lord Selborne to advocate a formal alliance with Germany as a counterbalance to a French-Russian alliance. This early effort was undone by an upwelling of mutual acrimony in the press over the Boer War, a burgeoning trade rivalry, and most specifically, by the inflammatory “Kruger Telegram” Kaiser Wilhelm sent to Transvaal President Kruger offering congratulations for repelling a British sponsored attack.⁸⁹ In Germany, Chancellor Bulow soon abandoned an early tentative attempt to bind Britain to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, instead seeking German dominance of world affairs via a new policy of “*weltpolitik*,” or world politics. Bulow understood his role to be one of providing political cover for Germany while the fleet was built up through the “danger zone” (the danger zone was the period where the fleet was sufficiently large to make Britain nervous enough to contemplate a preemptive “Copenhagen” attack, but not yet strong enough to defend itself). He noted “the task which was given to me in the summer of 1897 was: development of our commerce, transition to *weltpolitik*, and especially the creation of a German fleet without collision with England, whom we are no match for.”⁹⁰

The First Navy Law of 1897, which kicked off the German naval expansion, was initially viewed with disquiet by the Admiralty because they believed that it might trigger a concurrent expansion of the Dual Alliance French and Russian fleets. At the turn of the century, France was still the enemy of old to the British, while Russian railway-enabled expansion toward Afghanistan was viewed as a challenge to British hegemony on the Indian subcontinent, by circumventing Britain’s sea power. Britain’s naval building policy was based on the two-power standard of maintaining superiority over the next two largest navies combined: the French and Russian navies. This view began to shift by 1900 when it was realized that Germany could potentially *join* the Dual Alliance, destroying the balance of power in Europe that had held since 1815. When Lord

⁸⁹ Kennedy, *Antagonism*, 231.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 225.

Lansdowne became Foreign Secretary in 1900, he was directed to ensure that Germany didn't join in with any Continental alliance aimed at Britain: "We should use every effort to maintain and, if we can, to strengthen the good relations which at present exist between the Queen's Government and that of the Emperor."⁹¹ British observers were far more disturbed by the outbursts of popular anti-British feeling in Germany than the First Navy Law of 1898 or the Second Navy Law of 1900. The German press was violently anti-British, especially during the Boer War. These outbursts redoubled whenever the Kaiser erratically veered into one of his more pro-British moods.⁹²

The Kaiser spent considerable time in England with his extended family during his grandmother Queen Victoria's death watch in 1901. During this period he grew enthusiastic about an alliance between Germany and Britain, but Bulow did his best to dampen any move in this direction: "Everything now depends on neither discouraging nor encouraging the English", he cabled, "nor allowing ourselves to be prematurely tied to them. English troubles will increase...and with them the price that we can demand..."⁹³ The Kaiser's renewed warmth for his British cousins represented an opening that British diplomacy failed to take advantage of. From this point on, the window of opportunity for successful dissuasion was closing rapidly, pushed shut by growing public animosity and fundamental refusal to understand each other's positions. By 1902 British fears were aimed directly at the growing German fleet: Selborne told the Cabinet, "I am convinced that the great new German navy is being carefully built up from the point of a war with us...."⁹⁴

The two power standard, which had previously been directed at a French-Russian combination, was reassessed after the Japanese navy annihilated the Russian fleet at the battle of Tsushima in 1905. The Royal Navy argued that the German fleet was a much greater threat than Russia's denuded fleet. The Director of Naval Intelligence wrote that it was now necessary "to maintain a force in the North Sea sufficient to mask the German

⁹¹ George Monger, *The End of Isolation* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1963), 21

⁹² Ernest Woodward, *Great Britain and the German Navy* (London: Frank Cass, 1935), 2.

⁹³ Robert Massie, *Dreadnought* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1991), 301-2.

⁹⁴ Kennedy, *Mastery*, 215.

Fleet.”⁹⁵ Accordingly, the two-power standard was applied to France and Germany. Here the first attempt at dissuasion becomes apparent: The British publicly and diplomatically pointed out to the Germans that British supremacy at sea would be maintained regardless of the financial burdens. Tirpitz’s calculation that a competitive German navy could be fielded without the British responding, due to world-wide commitments of Empire, proved deeply flawed from the start.⁹⁶ British suspicions were raised to such an extent that even as early as 1902, when the Kaiser visited England he was deeply shocked by the hostility shown toward the German government, cabling Berlin that the German press must be muzzled before a crisis erupted, “[C]areful! They have 35 battleships in service here, and we have only 8!!”⁹⁷

2. British-German Relations Collapse

When Jackie Fischer took over at First Sea Lord in October of 1904, the redeployment of the fleet to home waters accelerated in a further dissuasive move, a fact not lost on German observers (nor were calls for a “Copenhagen” of the German fleet in the British press, which caused a brief panic in Germany). Royal Navy fleet redeployments were enabled by diplomatic initiatives that moved Britain away from its centuries-long policy of “splendid isolation.” In 1901 Britain concluded a formal alliance with Japan, and in 1904 an “Entente Cordiale” was reached with Britain’s ancient rival, France. British Foreign Minister Lascelles held a pointed conversation with German Ambassador Metternich making it clear that German fleet policy was the main obstacle to good relations between their two nations, and that the British people would never allow a superior navy in European waters. The British were erecting a seemingly insurmountable barrier to effective German competition by accelerating ship building and redeploying powerful fleet assets to home waters. Metternich passed Lascelles’ message on to Berlin, where it was becoming clear that Tirpitz’s fleet would exist in the danger zone for some time—perhaps forever. Rather than accepting this verdict, however, the Germans redoubled efforts to build a fleet capable of taking on the Royal Navy, which Britain

⁹⁵ Kennedy, *Antagonism*, 251.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 252.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 258.

again reluctantly responded to.⁹⁸ As First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher said in 1906, “Germany keeps her whole fleet always concentrated within a few hours of England. We must therefore keep a Fleet twice as powerful concentrated within a few hours of Germany.”⁹⁹ Despite intense British activity, Germany’s strategic culture was proving unresponsive to dissuasive moves.

Britain’s next move was at the second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, where British diplomats raised the question of naval arms limitations, but the British and German positions were too far apart. The recent introduction of a new class of battleships by the Royal Navy meant that any limitations would permanently codify British superiority at sea. At the behest of Jackie Fisher, a revolutionary new ship was launched in 1906 that instantly made obsolete every other battleship afloat: HMS *Dreadnought*. Eschewing the collection of various sized guns on all previous ships, she featured an armament of ten 12-inch guns. Incorporating thick armored belts, and the first application of steam turbines on large ships, she was faster, better protected, and far more powerful than any existing ship. Throughout the conference, British negotiators pointed out that Great Britain’s very survival depended upon its navy, while Germany still maintained the strongest military in the world even without a fleet. The Germans maintained that her status as a world power demanded a navy commensurate with that status, and one that could protect her interests and defend the German homeland. In the end, the second Hague Conference pushed the two countries farther apart in a growing atmosphere of mutual distrust and antagonism. The failure of the conference ended all hope of a general European armaments settlement, and greatly damaged the prospects for a bi-lateral agreement between Germany and Great Britain, although the British government decided to forge ahead with another attempt on this path.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Kennedy, *Antagonism*, 272.

⁹⁹ Herman, 482.

¹⁰⁰ Woodward, 5.

Just prior to the Hague Conference, Sir Eyre Crowe, a prominent official at the British Foreign Office, circulated a memo that analyzed German history and motivations. The memo proved every bit as incisive and influential as Kennan's famous Long Telegram on the motivations of Soviet behavior in 1945, crystallizing British policy toward Germany:

[It is not for] British Governments to oppose Germany's building as large a fleet as she may consider necessary or desirable for the defence of her national interests. It is the mark of an independent State that it decides such matters for itself, free from any outside interference, and it would ill become England with her large fleets to dictate to another State what is good for it in matters of supreme national concern... nothing would be more likely than any attempt at such dictation, to impel Germany to persevere with her shipbuilding programmes... It would be of real advantage...not to bar Germany's legitimate and peaceful expansion, nor her schemes of naval development...provided care were taken at the same time to make it quite clear that this benevolent attitude will give way to determined opposition at the first sign of British or allied interests being adversely affected. This alone would probably do more to bring about lastingly satisfactory relations with Germany than any other course... [T]here is one road which, if past experience is any guide to the future, will most certainly not lead to any permanent improvement of relations with any Power, least of all Germany, and which must therefore be abandoned: that is the road paved with graceful British concessions—concessions made without any conviction either of their justice or of their being set off by equivalent counter-services. The vain hopes that in this manner Germany can be "conciliated" and made more friendly must be definitely given up.¹⁰¹

In 1906 and 1907, German government borrowing, most especially for the navy, had put national finances into a precarious position. Political difficulties with direct taxation led to enormous increases in borrowing and ever higher interest rates. German spending on the navy jumped from the equivalent of 10.5-million pounds in 1900 to over 24-million pounds in 1913. Highlighting the futility of Germany's attempt to out-build Britain, Royal Navy expenditures in the same period rose to 51-million pounds. As expenditures increased to meet the needs of the 1906 and 1908 Navy Bills, the German government's credit rating fell, driving interest rates on government debt far higher than

¹⁰¹ Eyre Crowe, Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany, Foreign Office, January 1, 1907. Available from, http://tmh.floonet.net/pdf/eyre_crowe_memo.pdf (accessed May 2006).

that of France or Britain. Nearly all of this barrowing was financed by The City banks in London. This period marked a point where a determined effort to utilize financial leverage may have dissuaded Germany from further naval building efforts, but fractional politics and competing interests within Britain prevented any such effort.¹⁰²

The year 1907 saw the emergence of opposition within Germany to the massive building plan that was straining the countries finances. It was becoming apparent that Tirpitz's fleet would perpetually remain in the danger zone, and the German army began to mutter about diversion of resources and driving England into the French camp. Even Chancellor Bulow grew increasingly queasy when contemplating the extent of German debt.¹⁰³ In late 1907, once a three-way crisis between France, Britain, and Germany over colonial rights in Morocco appeared to be past, the British government once again contemplated an arms limitation agreement. Wilhelm once again stubbornly resisted any softening by the German government, and a temporary budget surplus allowed Germany to announce in November that an additional four battleships per year were to be laid down. The building race intensified, as politicians in both countries used the deteriorating relationship as ammunition in their own internal fights.¹⁰⁴

3. Final Attempts at Dissuasion

By 1909, the naval race was *the* burning source of friction between Germany and Britain, consuming the attention of both sides. In June of 1908 Germany passed its fourth Naval Law. British Admiralty analysis of expanding German ship-building capacity, and an apparent ability to accelerate the completion of hulls currently on the shipways, forced a corresponding British Navy Bill for an additional eight dreadnaughts in 1909. Tentative British approaches to the German government seeking a “naval holiday” from battleship building were taken as signs of weakness by the Emperor. Chancellor Bulow suggested that Britain was unable to withstand the financial strain of the naval race, and thought a deal might be struck for British neutrality in any continental war in exchange for recognition of British naval supremacy. This, of course, was a

¹⁰² Kennedy, *Antagonism*, 356-7.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 419.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 443.

fundamental misreading of Britain's interests and history: although England had abandoned splendid isolation with the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the entente with France, basic British policy was, and always would be, to ensure than no one nation gained hegemony over the continent of Europe. As Lord Grey wrote, "The Germans do not realize that England has always drifted or deliberately gone into opposition to any Power which establishes a hegemony in Europe."¹⁰⁵ Any agreement that granted Germany a free hand in this regard was impossible.¹⁰⁶ Aside from Britain's long standing desire to oppose any power on the Continent that appeared to be gaining supremacy, Britain's unique dependence upon maritime power meant that the sand in the gears of Anglo-German relations would always be by the German navy. Lord Selborne argued "Our stakes are out of all proportion to those of any other Power. To us defeat in a maritime war would mean disaster of almost unparalleled magnitude in history. It might mean the destruction of our mercantile marine, stoppage of our manufactures, scarcity of food, invasion, disruption of empire. No other country runs the same risks in a war with us."¹⁰⁷

During negotiations over a proposed railroad to Baghdad, German officials were told by Lord Grey that German naval expenditures were "the test of whether an understanding is worth anything...[but Britain] cannot sacrifice the friendship of Russia or France" to reach an accord.¹⁰⁸ These words, and many more like them, were passed directly to the Kaiser, which did nothing more than provoke tirades about the "blindness" of German diplomats.¹⁰⁹ No Englishman raised to believe in the efficacy of sea power would have denied the Germans a navy commensurate in size and power with its growing trade and rising position in the world, but the form it took—a massive North Sea

¹⁰⁵ Monger, 301.

¹⁰⁶ Woodward, 6-7.

¹⁰⁷ Kennedy, *Antagonism*, 416.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 416.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 415

battlefleet manifestly aimed at the heart of Great Britain—demanded an uncompromising response, especially in the atmosphere of rabid Anglophobia that overtook Germany since the Boer War.¹¹⁰

Britain's Liberal government that came to power in 1906 had swept into office in a landslide victory on promises to restrain naval spending. Thus, the government desperately wanted to dissuade Germany from accelerating its battleship building program, especially when it came to light in December of 1909 that German yards were stockpiling material in excess of needs laid down in the Fourth Navy Law of June 1908. The public and governmental alarm generated became known as the "Navy Scare of 1909." In order to dissuade Germany, Britain followed a dual-track policy of diplomacy and one-upsmanship in shipbuilding. First Lord of the Admiralty Reginald McKenna submitted Naval Estimates for an additional six dreadnaughts, while British diplomats pressured Germany to allow mutual inspections to reduce suspicion. Lord Grey expressed the British viewpoint in public Parliamentary sessions, and in private with the German Ambassador. If Germany insisted, the race would be vigorously pursued:

If we alone, among the great powers, gave up the competition and sank to a position of inferiority...we should cease to count for anything among the nations of Europe, and we should be fortunate if our liberty was left... There is no comparison between the importance of the German navy to Germany and our Navy to us. Our Navy is to us what their Army is to them. To have a strong Navy would increase their prestige, their diplomatic influence, their power of protecting commerce, but...it is not a matter of life and death to them...[as] it is to us. No superiority of the British Navy over the German Navy could ever put us in a position to affect their independence... But if a German Navy were superior to ours, they, maintaining the Army which they do...our independence, our very existence would be at stake....If I was asked to name one thing which would mostly reassure...Europe...I think it would be that the naval expenditures of Germany would be diminished, and that ours was following suit¹¹¹

British diplomats urged their German counterparts to allow naval attaches to inspect shipyards as a confidence building measure, but the Kaiser expressly refused any such scheme. When it became obvious that Germany *was* accelerating its dreadnought

¹¹⁰ Kennedy, *Antagonism*, 416.

¹¹¹ Massie, 617-8.

building program, there was little the British could do but inform Ambassador Metternich that England would respond in kind. When Metternich passed this information on to Berlin, it was met with stony silence. German intransigence ended debate within the British cabinet over the Naval Estimates: as Churchill wryly put it, “The Admiralty demanded six ships; the economists offered four; and we finally compromised on eight.”¹¹² The Scare also had the additional effect of pushing several influential Cabinet Ministers, most notably Churchill, into a permanent anti-German stance. It also forced the Royal Navy to focus nearly all of its attention on Germany. From this point forward, the two power standard would be dropped in favor of a policy of maintaining 60 percent superiority over a single enemy: Germany.¹¹³

The British resignation after 1911 can be summarized in a *Weekly Standard* article from May 1912:

Because of that formidable and threatening Armada across the North Sea, we have abandoned the waters of the Outer Oceans. We are in the position of Imperial Rome when the Barbarians were thundering at the frontiers. The ominous word has gone forth. We have called home the legions...¹¹⁴

By 1913, Germany was clearly loosing the naval arms race. Tirpitz still believed that given enough time, German industry and technology would give his fleet an edge in European waters, but the redeployment of the Royal Navy to home waters, successive British technological innovations such as *Dreadnought* and centralized gun fire-control, and most significantly, the apparent readiness of the British public to bear any burden in order to keep control of the seas, led him to tell the Reichstag in February that he would accept a British naval superiority of 60 percent. Concurrently with this, Churchill again proposed a naval building holiday, adding “[E]xpenditures on armaments, carried to an excessive degree, must lead to catastrophe, and may even sink the ship of European prosperity and civilization.” But it was too late. The Schlieffen Plan was in place, and

¹¹² Massie, 618.

¹¹³ Ibid., 625.

¹¹⁴ Kennedy, *Mastery*, 205.

von Moltke, chief of the German General Staff, spoke for the German government and much of its population when he said “War, the sooner the better!”¹¹⁵

C. ANALYSIS: BRITISH FAILED ATTEMPT AT DISSUASION

The growth of the German navy was inevitable, given the socio-economic factors changing Europe, and the worldwide navalism that prevailed. Britain recognized this, and attempted to dissuade Germany from directing this growth onto a path that threatened British interests. Britain had two demanding strategic imperatives—maintaining sea control and preventing a single power from dominating continental Europe. These interests sometimes complimented each other, but more often worked against each other. At several points, Britain could have reached an agreement with Germany that would have ensured continued sea control, but only at the cost of giving Germany a free hand on the Continent. That Britain was not willing to make this bargain, and Germany was not willing to forgo a powerful navy without Britain’s acquiescence on the Continent, essentially torpedoed any viable agreement between the two countries. Their fundamental strategic interests were too far apart. Indeed, the limited negotiations Britain and Germany did engage in only served to raise mutual suspicions and drive them further apart.

When alliance talks and naval limitation agreements failed to bare fruit, Britain turned to a policy of erecting barriers to effective competition in order to dissuade Germany. This strategy used three methods: rapid expansion of the British battlefleet through outbuilding Germany; forming alliances and resolving outstanding foreign disputes in order to redeploy combat power to home waters; and technological innovations such as HMS *Dreadnought* and centralized fire-control. Although this strategy gave Britain a commanding lead in fleet power, it was unsuccessful at dissuading Germany from making the attempt to compete. Britain failed to raise the barrier high enough to force Germany into the conclusion that effective completion was impossible—Germans believed they had the capacity to out-build Britain right up until 1913.

¹¹⁵ Herman, 488-9.

Britain's most powerful dissuasive weapon, the financial one, was never really on the table due to competing domestic interests. Germany's expansion, especially after 1906, depended on loans from London, but fractious politics and devotion to free-trade principles prevented any attempt at killing-off Germany's ship-building program through economic dissuasion. Indeed, Germany's dependence on outside credit for continued growth forced an internal debate in Germany on the idea that war was the only path out of the box they found themselves in. As in London, Germany was not politically unified, and a careful reading of German domestic politics coupled with the right forms of financial pressure might have prompted Germany to moderate its fleet build-up, had Britain been able to overcome its own domestic squabbles.

Throughout the first decade of the twentieth century, Britain carried out a strategic communications plan aimed at dissuading Germany from building its fleet. Repeated public, private, and diplomatic statements aimed specifically at convincing Germany that Britain would bare any price in order to maintain supremacy at sea were passed to German officials and the press. In the end, all of these statements failed to convince Germany to stand-down from their naval plan. This brings up the final, and perhaps most important, point: Germany's strategic culture prevented effective dissuasion. The combination of burgeoning German economic muscle, the Kaiser's belief in the efficacy of sea power, and a growing militarization of German society all conspired to make a path away from building a great battle-fleet highly unlikely.

D. LESSONS

Several lessons can be drawn from the study of British attempts to dissuade Germany prior to World War I.

1. Technological Leaps Can Put the Entire Board into Play

Radical new technologies can have profound and unintended effects on all states. *Dreadnought* not only made the German navy obsolete, it also made the British navy obsolete. The effect would have been even more profound had *Dreadnought* been German—contemplation of a “Copenhagen” of the German fleet surely would have gained greater currency in Britain in such a case. Outside of the strictly military terms of a

technological leap, the wider effect must be considered. *Dreadnought* put a damper on any possibility of a naval limitations accord between Britain and Germany due to the manifest inferiority of the German fleet following her introduction. No state will likely accept the voluntary imposition of permanent inferiority while they have the means to close the gap.

2. Erection of Cost and Technological Barriers is Unlikely to Succeed as a Dissuasion Strategy when the Target State Believes It Can Compete

A barrier strategy must present such an insurmountable barricade that the target state will not even attempt the competition. Britain's Naval Estimates were not sufficiently greater than Germany's to prevent contemplation of a race for superiority in European waters. Right up to 1913 Germany thought it could out build Britain, in spite of Britain's demonstrated financial commitment and fleet redeployment. Local security considerations also may drive behavior: The vast superiority enjoyed by the Royal Navy did not dissuade states around the world from building fleets to deal with local rivals.

3. Dissuasion Strategies are Susceptible to Failure by the Misinterpretation of the Strategic Environment

A fundamental difference in perception of the security environment among the parties involved may prevent effective dissuasion. Tirpitz's incorrect assumption that Britain would be forced by world-wide commitments to concede local parity in the North Sea was the theoretical basis of the German building program. This proved manifestly untrue; as Churchill noted, "It would be very foolish to lose England in safeguarding Egypt."

4. Competing Domestic Interests Can Doom a Dissuasion Strategy

In a government susceptible to pressure by interest groups, the most effective tools for dissuasion may be off-limits if a consensus is not built. German shipbuilding was primarily financed by British loans; the damage financial restrictions would have caused to powerful interest groups within Britain effectively put economic sanctions against Germany off-limits. The lack of a commonly accepted strategy with regard to

Germany, and rival interests within the Cabinet, meant that the British missed an opportunity to stop the buildup in its tracks by leveraging its financial power over Germany.

E. CONCLUSION

The failure of Britain’s attempt to dissuade Germany from building a fleet that could challenge the Royal Navy for sea control demonstrates the difficulties inherent in influencing a determined competitor. Britain subordinated its foreign policy to this singular goal, yet still failed to persuade Germany to turn aside from its goals. A robust building response, fleet redeployment, and diplomatic engagement failed to collectively influence German policy. The one method that might have worked—financial pressure—could not be contemplated due to domestic political considerations.

Ultimately, Britain’s policies allowed it to maintain maritime supremacy, but at no point was Germany’s build-up slowed by British actions. This case study provides a cautionary tale for policy makers who attempt to implement dissuasive policies that run counter to the strategic culture of the target state.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. PUTTING DISSUASION TO WORK

The strategy of dissuasion exists alongside and complements other national strategies such as deterrence and coercion, but also uses those strategies as part of a larger attempt at dissuasion. Dissuasion is a *framework* for assembling a range of strategies—including aggressive coercion—to influence the target. Dissuasion can be aimed at behavior or building capabilities, using a variety of techniques to persuade the target to adopt a stance acceptable to U.S. policy makers. Bringing dissuasion out of the theoretical realm and into the real world involves the application of the techniques identified from the case studies in this thesis:

- Erecting cost and technological barriers to competition, usually through presenting such an overwhelming force, technological lead, or “human capital” lead, that an opponent will conclude that effective competition is impossible.
- Presence and engagement operations, which promote confidence in the effectiveness of U.S. power and provide avenues for dialogue.
- Attempts to control the spread of technology such as embargo, interdiction, and legal restrictions.
- Conditional support and the threatened withdrawal of support, which forces the target state to choose between going down an undesirable path or losing U.S. military, economic, or moral aid.
- Building influence through economic ties, which grants leverage and entrée into influential sections of the target’s society and government.

With these tools in hand, a systematic dissuasion plan can be built by applying the following template to strategic goals:

- Define the behavior to be dissuaded and the desired behavior. Is the desired behavior within the range limits dictated by the target’s strategic culture?
- Identify the forces (vectors) pushing the targets behavior toward and away from the undesirable behavior.
- Select and apply tools for amplifying positive forces (vectors) and attenuating negative forces.
- Continuously evaluate the effect dissuasion is having on the target.
- Adjust to meet changing circumstances.

In two difficult challenges currently facing the United States—Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and China’s potential adoption of aggressive and expansionist policies—dissuasion provides options for policy makers to influence the course of events. Applying the principles above to these two issues illuminates the potential and limitations of dissuasion.

1. Iran

Iran, as in the Libyan example, is vulnerable to economic pressure. Embargoes, financial controls, and even blockade can be used to bring severe pressure upon the Iranian leadership to change course away from its nuclear ambitions. This kind of pressure, however, will likely only be effective if it is applied by the entire international community. Financial pressure brought by Europe and the United States alone will be unlikely to dissuade Iran, if they can turn to China and Russia for support (which brings to the fore the point that dissuasion must sometimes be applied to second-order targets such as China and Russia to meet primary strategic goals).

If other forms of dissuasion are to be successful, again as in the Libyan example, engagement with Iran should be practiced by the United States to provide the opening for a change in Iranian policy. In the final analysis, policy makers and operators must carefully analyze Iran’s strategic culture to find paths that are acceptable to the Iranian leadership and people. When directed at a regime strongly motivated by ideology, dissuasive pressure is unlikely to achieve its goals if the target state has the means to resist.

2. China

China’s strategic culture must be accounted for when formulating a specific dissuasion strategy aimed at preventing the emergence of an expansive and aggressive Chinese foreign policy. The strong nationalist sentiment that exists throughout China must be given room on the world stage to express itself while the West seeks to integrate China into the world system peacefully. If Washington attempts to curtail Chinese influence or adopts an overt policy of containment, it will likely give ammunition to militaristic elements in Chinese society to push a more aggressive stance, much as British

public antipathy toward Germany allowed Anglophobic Germans to take control of policy. As in the Anglo-German case, economic dissuasive pressure on China will be difficult to attempt due to domestic interests in the United States. An economic dissuasion program will have to be built around a win-win scenario for diverse American interests, a very tough proposition indeed.

Erecting barriers—such as overwhelming U.S. naval power—to military competition may be an effective dissuasive strategy, but care will have to be taken to keep the barrier so high that China will not be tempted to make the leap. Even if this policy is successful, it likely will not prevent the continuing expansion of Chinese military power due to China’s local security concerns. The aim should be to channel Chinese military power away from competing with the United States directly, not curtailing it completely. Finally, changes in military capability—such as the expansion of the Chinese Navy—will ultimately change strategic culture. Dissuasion policies must be constantly measured and adjusted to meet changing realities.

B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The following policy recommendations are based on the case studies in this thesis.

1. Enhance Cultural Education

Understanding the culture, especially the strategic culture, of the target state is vital to an effective dissuasion policy. Navy leaders should continue the recent push to strengthening foreign cultural education for military officers and officials. Building an effective dissuasion strategy requires a detailed knowledge of the target’s strategic culture, armed forces, domestic political scene, and economy. As in the Anglo-German case, where the British misread Germany’s fundamental strategic culture, a poor understanding of the target state can contribute to adoption of dissuasion policies that are ineffective, or even harmful.

2. Seek Domestic and International Consensus before Pursuing Economic Dissuasion

Economic strategies such as sanctions, technology controls, and blockade demand broad international consensus to be effective. In contrast with other sanctions regimes, sanctions directed against Libya were universal, giving Tripoli a choice between slow economic strangulation and changing its policies. By the same token, seek to mitigate the potential damage to domestic groups that may suffer losses from an economic dissuasion policy: Britain had an opportunity to dissuade Germany from further fleet expansion in 1907, but could not contemplate using this economic weapon due to competing domestic interests.

3. Consider Other Strategies as Part of an Overall Dissuasion Policy

Within the context of a long-term dissuasion strategy aimed at behavior or capabilities, deterrence, coercion, and appeasement can be utilized as part of the tool-set to achieve dissuasive strategic goals. In the Baltic and Libyan cases, deterrence, coercion, and appeasement were all used to affect the desired behavior. Naval strategists also should accept the fact that technology alone is not the sole source of military superiority. The quality, talent, professionalism, and entrepreneurship of the officer corps must be nurtured to protect the basis of current and future dissuasion strategies.

4. When Appropriate, Tailor Forces for Dissuasion

Military forces can be specifically configured to enhance dissuasion. An examination of the tools of dissuasion leads to certain conclusions about force tailoring to meet strategic goals. For instance, dissuading China's Navy from building the capabilities and policies for an aggressive sea-control navy requires a U.S. Navy "barrier to competition," composed of a large number of high-capability warships. At the opposite extreme, dissuading a South American nation from nationalizing its oil infrastructure, or West African oil-producing nation from drifting into China's orbit, requires relatively non-threatening engagement. Units best adapted for this role are

smaller, robust, naval vessels suited to engagement in austere ports without an accompanying large logistics footprint, and military-to-military contacts such as Special Forces training missions.

5. Seek Engagement, Even if Only at the Lowest Level

Engagement provides the basis for mutual understanding and can provide the opening through which a state can change policy course. Effective dissuasion strategies will use engagement to lay the ground-work for the targeted state to change its policies onto the desired path. In the Libyan case, low-level engagement set the stage for rapprochement by defusing tension and providing an avenue for initial discussions.

6. Continue Research into Dissuasion as a Strategy

The understanding of dissuasion is in the very early stages, similar to the situation in 1945 with deterrence. Further development of our understanding of dissuasion by the defense academic community and the military should be perused, to allow this powerful strategy to reach its full potential.

C. CONCLUSION

Dissuasion is a tool for policy makers to shape the international security environment into a form favorable to U.S. interests. This thesis has illustrated dissuasion strategies by studying past cases where states sought to shape the behavior of other states. As political and military leaders contemplate implementation of dissuasion to meet strategic goals, a theme that is throughout this study requires consideration: Know Thy Enemy. An effective dissuasion strategy must take into consideration the strategic culture, domestic politics, and the target state's capacity to resist.

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